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 Summary 
Brams and Taylor (1996) have developed a dispute resolution mechanism, the procedure 
of Adjusted Winner (AW), which they claim will produce solutions that are envy-free, 
efficient and equitable.1 Given these properties of fairness, the AW procedure may, if 
applied to civil war conflicts, provide parties with solutions that are acceptable at the 
negotiating table and are robust settlements in regard to implementation. 
In this thesis the preconditions of applying the AW procedure to civil war negotiations are 
identified through various investigations. First, a theoretical investigation is carried out by 
using theory on conflict resolution and bargaining to discuss assumptions of applying the 
AW procedure to civil war negotiations. Second, an empirical investigation is conducted 
into the negotiations on wealth sharing between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army / Movement (SPLA/M) in the recent IGAD talks of making 
peace in Sudan. Third, the AW procedure is applied hypothetically to the issues of wealth 
sharing of the IGAD talks. 
The preconditions for applying the AW procedure to civil war negotiations are related to 
the issues at stake, the parties at the negotiation table, the mediators and the aspect of 
implementing the deal. For instance must the mediators be able to demonstrate for the 
parties that the AW procedure guarantees them a favorable settlement and be trusted by 
the parties so they are willing to reveal their preferences. The precondition of defining 
what winning and sharing shall entail on each issue is especially problematized in the 
thesis. The process of defining what winning and sharing will imply on each issue decides 
to a great extent what outcomes can be produced by the AW procedure and to what extent 
the parties are likely to consider the outcomes as fair.   
                                              
1 Brams and Taylor (1996: 2, 68-75, 241) define “envy-freeness” as a property of a solution where “every part thinks he or she 
received the largest or most valuable portion of something – based on his or her own valuation – and hence does not envy anyone 
else”. Equitability they define as a property of settlement where each part “thinks that the portion he or she receives is worth the 
same, in terms of his or her valuation, as the portion that the other player receives in terms of that player’s valuation”. A 
settlement is “efficient” (Pareto-optimal) if there is “no other allocation that is strictly better for at least one player and as good for 
all the others”. 
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 1 Introduction 
What does it take to end civil wars? The most common way civil wars end is by military 
dominance. A peace “deal” is then based on the justice of the victors. A decisive victory 
of one party may lead to political stability and growth in a country, but it might also have 
disastrous negative consequences such as human and material costs of war, unfair 
agreements not addressing grievances and permanent marginalization of various groups. 
If a civil war can be ended primarily by negotiations and third-party support, this is in 
principle a normatively preferable way of creating peace. Through negotiations the 
government can be responsive to the grievances of its people and the opposition can put 
forward its demands in a setting like “normal politics”. Negotiations are the natural 
meeting point of battle groups for returning politics back to peaceful coexistence 
(Zartman 1995: 3). Particularly if an agreement can be reached which provides at least a 
minimum of functional institutions leading to further stability and progress within the 
country, negotiations are preferable to military ways of ending civil wars.  
Brams and Taylor (1996) have developed a dispute resolution mechanism, the procedure 
of Adjusted Winner (AW), which they claim will produce solutions that are envy-free, 
efficient and equitable. Brams and Taylor (1996: 2, 68-75, 241) define “envy-freeness” as 
a solution where neither of the players will trade its portion for that of the other. It is a 
division in which “every part thinks he or she received the largest or most valuable 
portion of something – based on his or her own valuation – and hence does not envy 
anyone else”. “Equitability” Brams and Taylor define as a property of a solution where 
both players receive the same number of points or utility. Each part “thinks that the 
portion he or she receives is worth the same, in terms of his or her valuation, as the 
portion that the other player receives in terms of that player’s valuation”. A settlement is 
“efficient” (Pareto-optimal) if there is “no other allocation that is strictly better for at least 
one player and as good for all the others”. Given these properties of fairness, the AW 
procedure may, if applied to civil war conflicts, provide parties with solutions that are 
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 acceptable at the negotiating table and are robust settlements in regard to implementation. 
The AW procedure has been applied hypothetically to several international disputes, 
including the Panama Canal treaty (Brams and Taylor 1996), Spratly Islands (Denoon and 
Brams 1997), Camp David accords (Brams and Taylor 1999) and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (Massoud 2000). However, the procedure’s practicality to civil wars is still 
unclear as no one has ever before applied it to a case of civil war. 
If the AW procedure can be fruitfully applied to prescribing a fair solution to a civil war 
conflict, it both has an analytical potential in suggesting solutions to different cases of 
civil wars and a practical potential as a tool for negotiators and mediators in resolving 
civil wars. As civil wars have become the major form of war in today’s world and proven 
sustainable and hard to resolve, an analytical and practical measure in resolving civil wars 
could be one step towards fewer civil wars and less human sufferings.   
The AW procedure starts by making assumptions about what issues are at stake and 
whether the issues are divisible or not. Then the parties’ utility values towards each issue 
are point allocated.2 The party that attaches most utility points to an issue wins on that 
issue. When all issues are shared according to this initial step, some issues are re-shared 
to make the total amount of utility points gained equal for both parties. In theory, the 
solutions created are equitable, envy-free and efficient and by creating an outcome with 
these criteria the procedure can be perceived as fair for the parties (Brams and Taylor 
1996: chap. 4).  
The AW procedure is interesting as it theoretically is an improvement of the more 
common fair division procedures, such as strict alternation and divide-and-choose (Brams 
                                              
2
 Brams and Taylor (1996: 246) define “utility of some portion of a good or goods to a player” as “a numerical value indicating 
that player’s degree of preference for that portion; if the player prefers one portion to another, then the former portion receives a 
higher value”. 
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 and Taylor 1999: 6).3 The procedure is also interesting as it is based on a standard of 
fairness which guarantees that the parties win on the issues they value most or satisfy the 
greatest subjective utility. Satisfaction of subjective utility is likely to be respondent to 
parties’ various concerns, in contrast to other standards of fairness which may be either 
normatively unacceptable or involve great risks for the parties. 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the applicability of the AW procedure, as a 
standard of fair division, to civil war negotiations. The recent IGAD talks of making 
peace in Sudan are chosen as an empirical case of civil war negotiations to investigate the 
general applicability of the procedure.4 The IGAD talks are interesting as this peace 
attempt is currently on-going and has been carried out with two parties at the negotiation 
table.5 Two parties is an advantage when applying the procedure as three or more parties 
will make the mathematics of the procedure complicated and satisfaction of all the three 
properties of fairness (envy-freeness, equitability and efficiency) impossible at the same 
time (Brams and Taylor 1999: 83-86).  
Great progress has been made in the IGAD talks in spite of a long lasting and complex 
civil war.6 With the signing of the Machakos protocol in July 2002, the two main 
                                              
3
 “Strict alternation” is a “procedure in which first one party chooses an item, then another party does, and so on, until all the 
items are exhausted” (Brams and Taylor 1999: 151). “Divide-and-choose” is a “discrete two-person fair-division procedure, 
applicable to a divisible heterogeneous good, in which one player (the divider) cuts a cake into two pieces, and the other player 
(the chooser) selects one of the pieces. It is proportional and envy-free but not efficient” (Brams and Taylor 1996: 240). 
4
 “IGAD” stands for “Inter-Governmental Authority on Development”. IGAD is a regional organization in the Horn of Africa / 
East Africa, consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. It was formed in 1986 (then as 
“IGADD”), and has the latest years been involved in peacemaking in Somalia as well as in Sudan (see www.igad.org). 
5
 The SPLA/M has been negotiating on behalf of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in the IGAD talks. The NDA is an 
umbrella organization of opposition parties and armed groups in Sudan, including amongst others the SPLA/M, the Democratic 
Unionist Party, the Sudan Alliance Forces and the Beja Congress (HRW 2003: 26). 
6
 Civil war has plagued Sudan since before independence in 1956, with relatively peace from 1972 to 1982. An estimated 2 
million lives have been lost since the war in the South re-started in 1983. Historically the wars have been fought over the control, 
access, and use of state power in the Sudan (Kok 1992: 104). Some historians have explained this state conflict as mainly a 
contest between the Arab and Muslim nationalism of the North and the more Christian and African identities of the South (Deng 
1995 and Lesch 1998). However, during the past few decades the civil war has become increasingly complex as Southerners are 
fighting Southerners, Muslims are fighting Muslims and oil areas have become a major war zone. According to Johnson (2003: 
xiii), “the Sudan entered the twenty-first century mired in not one, but many civil wars.” The motives for fighting in the wars are 
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 protagonists, the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLA/M), took a major step towards peace in Sudan.7 Since then, 
negotiations have taken place at different locations in Kenya. Issues have been addressed 
in areas of power sharing, wealth sharing, security and ultimately, “The Three Areas”.8 
There have been serious halt to the talks, but the signings of a protocol on security in 
September 2003, wealth sharing in January 2004 and power sharing and The Three Areas 
in May 2004, brought the parties closer to a final and comprehensive peace agreement. 
However, the war in Darfur (West Sudan), which erupted in early 2003 has derailed a 
final peace agreement and complicated the aim of the IGAD talks of establishing peace in 
Sudan. Today (October 2004), Sudan is in a paradoxical situation of having almost 
reached a momentous peace agreement regarding the 21 year lasting war in the South 
while a new and disastrous war in the West seems hard to resolve.  
Ideally, the AW procedure would be tested by a real-life application at the negotiation 
table in Kenya. However, such an application would have to be well prepared by the 
mediators and be based on risk assessments showing that the procedure most likely would 
facilitate the talks in a positive direction. In this thesis I opt for a hypothetical application 
of the AW procedure. Hopefully such an application can reveal what preconditions which 
have to be met in order to apply the AW procedure successfully to a real-life situation of 
civil war negotiations.  
                                                                                                                                                  
various, but some common “root causes” of the wars can be traced to exclusionist policies of various forms of government in 
Sudan, both historically and up to the present day (Johnson 2003: xiii-xx).  
7
 In the Machakos protocol the issue of state and religion was principally resolved by agreement on continuance of Islamic Sharia 
law in the North, but opening up for a secularly based law system in the South. The issue of self-determination in the South was 
handled by agreement on the establishment of a regional government of Southern Sudan and a referendum on secession or unity 
after a six-year interim period (Machakos protocol 2002). 
8
 The Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei are the areas in Sudan labeled as the “The Three Areas”. Their degree of 
autonomy, right to be a part of Southern Sudan and representation in Khartoum were highly contested issues in the talks (see ICG 
2003a, ICG 2003b and ICG 2003c for more on The Three Areas as an issue in the talks). 
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 Specifically, the issues of wealth sharing in the IGAD talks between the GOS and the 
SPLA/M represent the empirical case for a hypothetical application of the AW procedure 
in this thesis. The negotiations on wealth sharing addressed issues as sharing of oil 
revenues, government transfers, central bank and currency, ownership of land, 
management of the petroleum sector and the control of development and reconstruction 
funds. Why apply the AW procedure to the issues of wealth sharing of the recent IGAD 
talks of peace in Sudan? 
The issues of wealth sharing seem suitable as a set of issues as they exhibit clear 
quantifiable aspects. The AW procedure requires point allocation of utility value and the 
importance of economic issues are likely to be possible to point allocate and systema-
tically compare. Another aspect is that although the IGAD talks have addressed issues of 
power sharing, security and The Three Areas in addition to wealth sharing, the issues of 
wealth sharing were to a large extent negotiated as a self-contained area (Stiansen 2004 
[interview]; GOS informant 2004 [interview]).9 That means that it is possible to treat the 
issues of wealth sharing as an isolated set of issues since the parties seemed to agree to 
them without serious considerations of how other issues were resolved. Finally, an 
advantage in applying the AW procedure to the issues of wealth sharing is that several 
documents indicating the positions and preferences of the parties during the peace talks 
are available, as well as the agreement from January 2004 which shows how the issues 
finally were addressed and what became acceptable terms for the parties.  
Still, how realistic is it that fairness arguments of envy-freeness and equitability can be 
acceptable in civil war negotiations as the IGAD talks, where one party (the GOS) 
                                              
9
 As a part of the research process, I tried to apply the AW procedure to all the major issues of the IGAD talks. However, such a 
general application seemed to require a high number of issues included and was therefore hard to carry out in a fruitful way. An 
alternative to my application of the AW procedure to the issues of wealth sharing could be an application of the AW procedure to 
a few outstanding issues at a certain point of the negotiation process. For instance could the AW procedure have been applied to 
issues which presumably had to be traded in the preparation of the “Nakuru document” (a mediator suggested framework for a 
settlement of the outstanding issues of July 2003, see chap 4.1), or the final issues (like Abyei and the national capital) during the 
talks in February to May 2004. 
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 controls most of the resources and issues at stake and where wealth sharing means that the 
GOS has to “give away” resources and powers which it now controls? As the GOS has 
greater power than the SPLA/M in terms of military capacity, income and administrative 
apparatus, it would probably seem more favorable for the GOS to bargain hard for a great 
portion of the issues than to apply a procedure which establishes a deal of envy-freeness 
and equitability. These objections to applying the AW procedure to the IGAD talks and 
civil war negotiations in general are important and are discussed in more detail in chapter 
3 and 6. However, two points regarding the objections to applying the AW procedure to 
the IGAD talks should be made here in the introduction. One point is that the parties in 
the IGAD talks agreed to create an equitable sharing of wealth (Agreement on wealth 
sharing 2004: chapter 1). Although the specific meaning of the term was contested, it was 
concretized with other principles and the AW procedure may have been relevant as a way 
of deciding on what is an equitable sharing of wealth in Sudan. Another point is that 
although an application of the AW procedure to the IGAD talks may have been 
practically difficult and unacceptable for the parties, it does not mean that a solution 
suggested by the AW procedure is not possible to agree to or not favorable for a stable 
peace. Given these points, an application of the AW procedure to the issues of wealth 
sharing of the IGAD talks is fruitful although serious objections can be raised to the 
choice of case for an application of the procedure. 
1.1 Research question 
Brams and Taylor claim that the AW procedure can be a useful tool of conflict resolution 
as it guarantees fair shares to parties of a conflict. However, the objections to applying the 
procedure presented above and several assumptions of the procedure call into question 
how suitable the AW procedure is for settling civil war conflicts. One assumption of the 
procedure is additivity, which means that when sharing the issues to the parties, the utility 
satisfied should correspond to the initial rating of the issues before the sharing. In practice 
this means that the issues must be separable. Another assumption of the procedure is 
linearity, which means that the marginal utility of gaining or losing on an issue should be 
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 constant no matter how the issue is shared among the parties.10 In practice this means that 
getting 2 percent of oil revenues should be double as good as getting 1 percent of oil 
revenues. In addition to these assumptions regarding the issues at stake, an application of 
the AW procedure to civil war conflicts relies on some wider and general assumptions: 
That parties in a civil war attend negotiations, that utility based characteristics of fairness 
(envy-freeness, equitability and efficiency) can play a role in such negotiations, and 
thirdly that a settlement based on the AW procedure increase the chances for a successful 
implementation of the agreement. In addition, if the parties are to carry out the AW 
procedure themselves, an application assumes that the parties can bind themselves to a 
procedure in reaching a settlement and be honest in their point allocation of utility. All 
these assumptions call into question whether the AW procedure realistically can be 
applied to a civil war conflict and eventually under what conditions the AW procedure 
can facilitate negotiations on ending a civil war. 
In order to identify the preconditions which have to be met for a successful application of 
the procedure, the AW procedure has to be investigated in the context of civil war 
conflicts. Three investigations are carried out in this thesis to explore the context of civil 
war conflicts. First, a theoretical investigation is conducted into literature on ending civil 
wars and negotiations of internal conflicts. Second, a case study into the negotiations on 
wealth sharing which took place between August 2002 and January 2004 in Kenya is 
carried out. Third, a hypothetical application of the AW procedure to the issues of wealth 
sharing of the IGAD talks is conducted. Based on the three investigations, some of the 
most important preconditions for an application of the AW procedure to civil war 
conflicts are sought identified. The research question of this thesis is as follows:  
What preconditions have to be met for an application of the AW procedure to civil war 
negotiations? 
                                              
10
 Brams and Taylor define “linearity” as constant marginal utilities of the players. By “additivity” they mean that the value of 
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 Some central terms of the research question needs a definition. The “preconditions” 
which will be sought identified in this thesis are empirical situations which have to take 
place if the AW procedure is going to be applied successfully in a civil war negotiation. 
When Brams and Taylor (1996; 1999) discuss the applicability of the AW procedure, they 
use the term “assumption” to describe certain features which an application of the AW 
procedure “take for granted”. The concept of assumption is also used in this thesis, but for 
simplicity only the concept of “precondition” is applied in the discussion (chapter 6) to 
describe various empirical situations as well as procedural prerequisites of the AW 
procedure which have to be met to apply it to civil war negotiations.  
An application of the AW procedure to civil war negotiations can be carried out in 
roughly two different ways. One alternative is to apply the AW procedure directly, 
meaning that the parties themselves to a large extent participate in carrying out the 
procedure. The parties would then define the set of issues, define what winning and 
sharing implies on each issue, point allocate the utility value of each issue and bind 
themselves to the outcome of the procedure after it is provided by a mediator. Another 
alternative is to apply the AW procedure indirectly. Then mediators or researchers carry 
out the different steps of the procedure based on interviews and information on the 
parties’ preferences and suggest a specific fair division being justified by the AW 
procedure. Dependent on the specific negotiation setting and what seems practicable 
suitable, a combination of a direct and an indirect application of the AW procedure can be 
carried out. In this thesis, I will identify what seem to be preconditions of both a direct 
and an indirect application of the AW procedure to civil war negotiations. 
Finally the terms “civil war negotiations” and “civil war” have to be defined. “Civil war 
negotiations” can be defined as “a decision making process involving parties of a civil 
war where the official aim is to establish a peace deal incorporating central issues of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
two or more goods to a player is equal to the sum of their points (Brams and Taylor 1996: 72). 
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 conflict”.11 A “civil war” can be defined as “a military conflict within a state where the 
national government is one of the active parties and where both parties in the conflict can 
and intend to struggle despite any costs” (Small and Singer 1982: 210).  
1.2 Outline 
In identifying the preconditions that have to be met for applying the AW procedure to 
civil war negotiations I carry out three different investigations (mentioned above). The 
different investigations involve different methodological challenges and these are 
discussed in chapter two. Also, the research design as a basis for identifying preconditions 
of the AW procedure is discussed in that chapter.  
In chapter 3, the theoretical investigation is carried out. I present the AW procedure 
developed by Brams and Taylor (1996) and show why the AW procedure in theory 
produces settlements that are envy-free, equitable and efficient. Specific assumptions of 
the AW procedure are discussed, as well as more general assumptions concerning the 
aspect of applying the AW procedure to civil war conflicts.  
In chapter 4, the negotiations on wealth sharing in Sudan following the Machakos 
protocol are presented. How did the negotiations proceed? What were the issues of wealth 
sharing? How were the issues addressed? What were the positions of the parties? 
Investigations into these analytical questions form the basis for a hypothetical application 
of the AW procedure to the issues of wealth sharing and for a discussion on the practical 
preconditions of applying the AW procedure to civil war negotiations. 
In chapter 5, I investigate how the AW procedure can be carried out on the issues of 
wealth sharing. I present a settlement based on a hypothetical distribution of utility points 
and discuss whether the AW solution is a fair settlement. I also work out two alternative 
                                              
11
 Adopted from Underdal’s (2001: 293) definition of negotiations: “Negotiations is a process of decision making where two or 
more parties work out and discuss different proposals with the official aim of reaching a solution to a common problem”.  
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 applications of the AW procedure: One by entitling the parties to unequal shares and one 
based on maximization of different goals of the parties.   
In chapter 6, the hypothetical application of the procedure is critically evaluated and 
preconditions of applying the procedure to civil war negotiations are suggested on the 
basis of the different investigations.  
In chapter 7, the main preconditions of applying the AW procedure to civil war 
negotiations which have been identified in the thesis are summed up and I briefly discuss 
whether these preconditions realistically can be met in civil war negotiations.  
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 2 How to identify preconditions for applying the AW procedure 
In this thesis I focus on identifying the preconditions which have to be met for applying 
the AW procedure to civil war negotiations. As a research design, three different 
explorations are conducted to identify the preconditions of the AW procedure. One 
investigation is carried out into theoretical findings of literature on negotiations and how 
civil wars end. Another inquiry is conducted into the real-life negotiations on wealth 
sharing of the IGAD talks. Finally, a hypothetical application of the AW procedure to the 
issues of wealth sharing of the IGAD talks is carried out.  
It could be argued that the case study of the negotiations on wealth sharing and the 
hypothetical application of the AW procedure to a great extent are connected and should 
be treated as one case study. However, it seems orderly to separate these investigations as 
they are based on different scientific criteria: While the investigations into the 
negotiations of wealth sharing is to be a strictly empirically based inquiry, the application 
of the AW procedure is a hypothetical application of a normative theoretical procedure, 
which attempt to be empirically based but which have not been carried out in real-life.  
Carrying out the three different investigations to identify preconditions of the AW 
procedure involve different methodological challenges. In this chapter I discuss the 
methodological challenges of conducting the different investigations and the prospects of 
deriving valid preconditions of the AW procedure on the basis of the three investigations. 
2.1 Identifying preconditions through a theoretical investigation 
The theoretical investigation of how civil wars end and how the AW procedure can 
facilitate such processes is carried out by establishing a framework for ending civil wars 
by negotiations and on the background of this framework propose some explicit 
assumptions of what an application of the AW procedure has to lead to in order to 
facilitate an ending of a civil war. By making explicit what assumptions which seem to 
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 underlie an application of the AW procedure, the theoretical argumentation can be tracked 
by the reader and eventually criticized. The assumptions are discussed in a critical 
perspective to identify possible preconditions of the AW procedure. These suggested 
preconditions are re-evaluated in chapter 6 where preconditions of the AW procedure are 
discussed in the light of the theoretical investigation, the case study of the negotiations on 
wealth sharing and the hypothetical application of the AW procedure.  
2.2 Identifying preconditions through a case study of the negotiations on wealth 
sharing 
The investigation into the negotiations on wealth sharing has two aims: Firstly to explore 
the context and course of a specific civil war negotiation for suggesting general 
preconditions for a real-life application of the AW procedure, and secondly to establish 
the information needed for a hypothetical application of the AW procedure to the issues 
of wealth sharing. To meet these aims, specific questions have been worked out to 
establish an analytical focus for the investigation.12 As a research method, a case study is 
conducted to answer these questions.13  
Scientific control in the case study of the negotiations on wealth sharing has been sought 
by acquiring different types of sources as well as a triangular and critical utilization of the 
sources.  The data sources which the case study primarily rely on are the agreement on 
wealth sharing of January 2004, a limited selection of proposals or position papers issued 
                                              
12
 The four questions are: What were the issues of wealth sharing? How were the issues addressed? What were the positions of 
the parties to the issues? What was the role of the mediators and the resource persons during the negotiations? 
13
 Yin (2003) defines a case study as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident". Further Yin notes that "the 
case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data 
points, and as one result [it] relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and 
as another result [it] benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis". Case 
studies are conducted in various forms. Generally it can be differed between multi- and single-case studies, exploratory case 
studies, descriptive case studies and explanatory case studies (see Yin 2003b: 5). Also, case studies vary in whether they attempt 
to arrive at theoretical generalizations based on the evidence from the case, or simply investigate the individual case (Yin 2003a: 
15). 
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 by the parties during the negotiations in September-October 2003, a draft framework for a 
resolution of the outstanding issues proposed by the mediators in July 2003 (the "Nakuru 
document") and statements given in personal interviews carried out in January-March 
2004. Utilizing the data sources as evidence or indications of the preferences and 
positions of the parties is not a straightforward task. Below the different types of sources 
are presented in detail and the challenges of utilizing them are discussed.  
2.2.1 Documents as data material 
The agreement on wealth sharing of January 2004 and the Nakuru document of July 2003 
are documents which are made available through the internet.14 In investigating how the 
issues of wealth sharing were addressed in the talks, the Nakuru document is useful as a 
source of evidence as it shows what the mediators and the resource persons thought the 
parties could accept as arrangements by July 2003.  The agreement of January 2004 is a 
useful source of evidence as it shows what finally became acceptable for the parties in a 
written and binding agreement. There may exist side agreements on sensitive issues, as 
both parties may have felt it beneficial to keep arrangements on certain issues secret 
because of serious internal opposition and potential international reactions. However, in 
my investigations I found no clear indications on the existence of a side agreement. I 
therefore assume that the paragraphs of the agreement can be treated as a reliable source 
of what arrangements for wealth sharing during the interim period which became 
acceptable for the parties in January 2004. It should though be mentioned that before an 
eventual signing of a final peace agreement of the IGAD talks, the parties are to revisit 
the initial protocols and agree upon implementation modalities. Important specifications 
to the arrangements of the agreement on wealth sharing may thus be added. 
                                              
14
 While the agreement on wealth sharing was agreed to be public by the parties, the Nakuru document was supposed to be kept 
secret. However it "appeared" on the internet short time after it had been presented by the mediators in July 2003. 
 22
 A third form of documents that I utilize in the case study of the negotiations on wealth 
sharing, are a limited selection of proposals or position papers, which were issued 
between the parties in Naivasha in September and October 2003.15 They are historically 
conditioned documents as they were issued at a particular time of the negotiations and 
cover certain issues. In utilizing these documents as sources it has to be considered that 
the issues of wealth sharing had been worked on continuously since May 2002 and that 
these documents were issued at a time of the negotiations where certain issues had a 
status as “initially agreed to”. My collection of proposals/position papers potentially 
suffers from selection bias as it represents a limited selection of the total number of 
proposals which circulated between the parties. Nonetheless, compared to the total 
number of proposals, my selection of position papers do cover all the major issues of 
wealth sharing of what became the agreement of January 2004 and are from both of the 
parties. I therefore regard my collected proposals/position papers as reliable sources on 
the communicated positions of the parties in September and October 2003. 
In discussing what the priorities of the parties were in the negotiations, I study how the 
positions of the parties developed from the Nakuru document, via the proposals/position 
papers to the agreement of January 2004. By checking which positions were upheld and 
in which issues the parties seemed to make concessions, I suggest what issues and 
positions were of greater importance for the parties.  
A potential problem of deducing the importance of an issue or the preferences of the 
parties based on the movement of the related position is that it has to be considered 
whether the original position to a large extent was a maximalist position and a movement 
did not really involve any serious concession for the party. The proposals/position papers 
do not show the parties' secret dispositions of the issues and what they considered as red- 
                                              
15
 Ideally all the proposals or position papers which circulated among the parties at the talks would be used as a source of 
evidence of the positions of the parties. However, I was not able to acquire a complete collection of proposals and positions 
papers as they in principle are confidential. 
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 and blue-line positions. Thus the genuine positions or the preferences of the parties are 
not necessarily shown by the proposals/position papers, but the communicated positions 
of the parties at certain dates of the negotiations are stated. In using the proposals/position 
papers as sources of evidence of the preferences of the parties, it thus has to be critically 
considered whether the communicated positions are tactical dispositions in a bargaining 
process or genuine positions which reflect the preferences of the parties. As the Nakuru 
document contains suggested compromises on the issues, positions which are distant from 
the arrangements of the document can be considered as highly maximalist positions. Also 
the interviews provide a check of what were the priorities of the parties of the issues and 
to what extent the suggested solutions of the proposals/position papers were maximalist 
positions.  
Another potential problem in deducing the importance of the issues based on the 
movements of the parties from the Nakuru document and the proposals/position papers to 
the agreement, is that it assumes that the parties were rational actors in giving in on the 
issues in which they least valued and hold on to the issues of greatest importance. In a 
bargaining process and during several rounds of negotiations, parties may accept solutions 
not only due to rational concerns. For instance may one party suddenly give in on an issue 
and demand an equal concession from the other party. Then a former red-line position of 
a party may be perceived as less important and given in to, as suddenly an opportunity of 
winning on another issue emerges. In relation to such a situation, or generally through 
negotiations, a limited capacity of information processing may also lead to acceptance of 
a certain arrangement although it contradicts what has been laid down as priorities or 
overall goals of a party. An informant of the SPLA/M (2004 [interview]) illustrates this 
by his statement that "our negotiators tend to forget our priorities".  
At the same time as there are reasons why the parties may agree to solutions that do not 
correspond to their agreed priorities, it can be held that the preferences of the parties in 
the talks are roughly reflected by the moves in the negotiations as the parties tried to 
avoid being influenced by the above mentioned dynamics. One informant of the SPLA/M 
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 (2004 [interview]) stated that they deliberately did not want to develop too strong 
personal relationships with the GOS delegation in order to avoid making concessions that 
were not corresponding to their agreed priorities. If the SPLA/M eventually were going to 
make a greater concession, the delegation had extended meetings where all members of 
the team could speak up. The intension of such meetings was to avoid a split of the group 
following a concession and to avoid making unsound priorities. The SPLA/M thus had 
collective mechanisms to establish some agreement on their priorities. It is probably 
reasonable to believe that parties negotiating an end to a civil war are highly concerned 
about what should be their priorities and try to be conscious about these throughout the 
negotiations. Of course the various forms of pressure negotiators in a civil war negotiation 
face as well as the changing situation on the battlefield may make it hard for a negotiator 
to focus on what are the priorities of its party and only agree to terms consistent with its 
priorities. However, in the utilization of the documents I assume that the movements of 
the parties from the Nakuru document, via the proposals/position papers and to the 
agreement, can be treated as relatively reliable indications of the priorities of the parties.  
Still, as have been discussed above, there are several reasons why deducing preferences 
and positions of the parties may be problematic on the basis of the documents. A 
triangulation of data material between documents and interviews may increase the 
validity of the investigation into the positions and preferences of the parties. 
2.2.2 Interviews as data material 
Interviews with key informants were carried out in January, February and March 2004.16 
Most informants were met in Nairobi, while others were met in Oslo (Norway), New Site 
                                              
16
 One informant, Endre Stiansen, was interviewed at various dates between August 2003 and September 2004. He is one of the 
IGAD resource persons and had great influence on this thesis by being my supervisor. The close cooperation with him was useful 
since he could suggest qualified informants and inform widely of how the issues were addressed. On the other hand, I had to 
balance the usefulness of my supervisor against not becoming biased by relying on him as an informant. By crosschecking some 
of his statements and interviewing a broad selection of other informants, I have tried to avoid a biased dependence on him as an 
informant.  
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 (Southern Sudan), Naivasha (Kenya) or Khartoum (Sudan). In selecting the interview 
objects I tried to cover the major groups involved in the negotiations on wealth sharing 
(the GOS, the SPLA/M, the mediators and the international observers).  
From the SPLA/M delegation five representatives were interviewed. Unfortunately the 
leader of the SPLA/M team on wealth sharing was not interviewed, though two of the 
SPLA/M interview objects are probably well informed on what took place at the top level 
of the negotiations.  
From the GOS delegation three representatives were interviewed, including the leader of 
the team on wealth sharing. Two representatives of the international observers were 
interviewed, while one mediator of the IGAD secretariat was met. Also, interviews were 
carried out with three press workers covering the peace talks. As representatives from all 
the major groups involved in the negotiations as well as representatives from the media 
were interviewed, the most important perspectives on how the issues were addressed and 
what were the positions and preferences of the parties have hopefully been detected.  
On average the interviews lasted an hour and most of them were recorded. During the 
interviews I used an interview guide, but the interviews developed into guided 
conversations. I had some questions for which I wanted to have answers and some topics I 
wanted to cover, but I let the interview objects talk freely and improvised the order of the 
topics as the conversation developed. To get analytical answers on the questions for 
which I was particularly interested, I tried initially to ask open and neutral questions 
instead of specific and judging questions. For instance in investigating the positions of the 
parties and the utility basis of the issues, I started with open questions and eventually 
followed up with more specific questions testing my hypothesis on the positions of the 
parties. Also, I started by asking about the positions of the antagonist if the interview 
object represented a specific party in the talks. By applying these simple techniques of 
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 creating confidence, I tried to avoid defensiveness of the interview object and to get 
honest and analytical answers.17   
While the documents are exploited as physical evidence (“levninger”) of the negotiations 
on wealth sharing, the interviews are utilized as accounts (“beretninger”) on the talks.18 
To utilize the interviews as accounts, the replies must be critically evaluated in relation to 
several aspects.  A potential flaw of the replies given in the interviews is that the 
informants may have presented themselves as having consistent opinions or preferences 
over time, although this was not the case. For instance when asking a party as to why they 
accepted a certain solution to an issue, the respondent may present the solution as being a 
favorable term and meeting the parties’ considerations to a large extent. However, 
bargaining dynamics or international engagement may have led to a changing view of the 
informant towards an issue during the negotiations which in turn resulted in the 
acceptance of a certain paragraph. By crosschecking the replies of the informants by 
statements of other interviewees and the documents, I try to reveal an eventual false 
consistency of an informant’s replies.  
Also, by taking into account the interests of the informant and the version of the 
negotiations that he or she may want to present I try to critically evaluate the statements 
and interests of the interviewees. For instance, both negotiating parties may have an 
interest in presenting their positions to me as a Norwegian researcher as having been in 
favor of “making unity attractive” (Norway’s position in the talks was pro solutions that 
would make unity attractive and functional). Eventually if an informant gave a statement 
on a topic that he or she most probably does not have particular interest, then the reply 
                                              
17
 It should also be mentioned that I presented myself as a cooperator of my Endre Stiansen who was involved in the negotiations 
as a resource person of the IGAD secretariat. He is well informed on the positions and priorities of the parties and the interview 
objects thus knew that I probably knew a lot about their positions and priorities through Endre and that I could eventually cross 
check their answers. This fact probably strengthens the reliability of the answers given in the interviews.   
18
 See Dahl (1967: 37-39) on the difference between utilizing sources as physical evidence (“levninger”) or accounts 
(“beretninger”). 
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 can be treated as relatively reliable (Dahl 1967: 72-73). However, of the interviews 
carried out with representatives of the parties, it was hard to find statements that could not 
be colored by interests. This is probably due to the “life and death” importance of the 
talks for the parties in a context of a civil war. The replies of mediators and internationals 
are most probably more reliable than the statements of the parties, as the mediator’s 
interests in presenting a certain view of the talks and the actors involved are not as deep 
as the interests of representatives of the parties. I therefore assume in general that the 
responses of the internationals and the mediators are more reliable than the replies of the 
negotiating parties.  
2.3 Identifying preconditions through a hypothetical application of the AW 
procedure 
The idea of the AW procedure is to establish a fair division based on point allocation of 
utility. But what method for point allocation will give appropriate assignments in which 
the parties can be comfortable? If the AW procedure is going to be applied to a real-life 
situation of a conflict and the parties are to accept the outcome of the procedure, they 
have to be convinced that their preferences are appropriately represented by points. In an 
application of the AW procedure it should therefore be shown how point allocation of 
utility realistically can be carried out in a specific conflict and with a specific set of 
issues. Below I discuss challenges of point allocation and present a step-wise procedure 
for how parties can arrive at point allocation of utility. In the development of this step-
wise procedure I have sought methodological guidance of how the AW procedure has 
been applied to other conflicts (Brams and Taylor 1996, Denoon and Brams 1997 and 
Massoud 2000). 
As the value of winning on the issues of wealth sharing can not be adequately described 
by a single attribute (e.g. money), the allocation of utility value to the issues is a complex 
value problem (Keeney and Raiffa 1993: 15). I therefore suggest that as a first step 
towards point allocation of utility, the factors which make an issue important or less 
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 important have to be specified. An item may have a utility value due to several different 
value factors. The item may have an economic value, a power-political value, a security-
military value or a cultural-religious value for a party. Such categories of utility can be 
useful in making explicit what the basis of utility of an issue is. In addition to these forms 
of utility of an item, issues may vary to which extent they involve risks (Raiffa 1982: 154-
155).19 Although an issue seems to have a great economic value for a party, it may 
involve a large risk of becoming jeopardized. By investigating and stating potential risk 
factors attached to the issues, a broader basis of utility of the issues can be discovered. 
Also, winning on an issue may involve a future benefit which is not as a good as a benefit 
at hand. Whether an issue should be discounted have to be explored and taken into 
account when deciding the utility value of an issue.  
In the hypothetical application of the AW procedure the assumed basis of utility for the 
issues of wealth sharing are presented (table 5.1). While the sources of utility value for 
the issues which are assumed to be most important for each party are listed, the risk 
factors and the eventual discount factors are not presented as that would involve a quite 
extensive investigation. The interviews serve as the primary data material for listing the 
assumed basis of utility value for the different issues.   
As a second step towards point allocation, it should be specified what winning and 
sharing implies for each party on each issue (Brams and Taylor 1999: 104). Point 
allocation of utility value requires such a specification, as otherwise it will be impossible 
for the parties to compare the importance of winning on the different issues. If they know 
what they will lose if the other party wins and what they eventually will win if they win, 
point allocation of the utility value of each issue can be carried out with a clear reference.  
                                              
19
 A “risk” can be defined as “the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen” (New Oxford Dictionary of 
English). 
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 Stating what winning and sharing will imply before carrying out the procedure makes it 
also possible to “decode” the division of the issues suggested by the procedure into a real-
life settlement. As Denoon and Brams (1997: 322) notice in the application of the AW 
procedure to the Spratly Islands controversy, how the equitability adjustments are going 
to be transformed into a practical solution may be complicated and carried out in 
alternative ways. The more detailed the implications of winning on each issue are 
specified in advance the less is probably the potential for conflicts over what specific 
terms of agreement are produced by the AW procedure. It is not a necessity to agree to in 
advance how the issues eventually are going to be shared, as the parties may agree to this 
after the procedure is carried out. Brams and Taylor (1999: 105) suggest that if the parties 
do not know who will receive what portion in the equalization adjustment (see chapter 
3.1), they can agree to what constitutes a certain share of the different issues. However, if 
possible it is probably an advantage to agree to what sharing will imply beforehand, as the 
potential for conflicts after the AW procedure has been carried out is reduced.   
In the hypothetical application of the AW procedure I suggest implications of winning 
and sharing of the issues (table 5.2). I assume that these winning and sharing implications 
could have been reasonable in a real-life application of the AW procedure to the issues of 
wealth sharing of the IGAD talks.  
As a third step of point allocation, the issues have to be systematically compared to work 
out an additative scale of utility values from 0-100. This can be done by first setting up an 
ordinal ranking of the importance of winning on the different issues. On the basis of the 
explicit formulations on the utility basis of each issue and the implications of winning and 
sharing, issues which a player most strongly wants to win on are ranked at top, while 
issues of less importance are ranked lower. An important source of utility which initially 
had not been taken into account in the initial listing of sources of utility in step 1, may 
emerge as a result of this process and be supplemented to the list (Brams and Taylor 
1999: 101).  
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 After having worked out an ordinal ranking, the intensity of preferences for the different 
issues must be taken into account to distribute a total of 100 utility points across the 
issues. This can be done by first comparing the importance of winning on the issues 
ranked at top, with the issues ranked second. If winning one issue turns out to be just as 
important as winning on two other items, this issue will get as many points as the two 
others combined. Then the importance of winning on the issues ranked second can be 
compared with the issues ranked third, and so on (Raiffa 1982: 151-3). As an alternative, 
the issues can roughly be given point assignments and then packages of issues worth 50 
utility points can be compared to each other and it can be evaluated whether they are of 
equal value. If the two packages of 50 points are not of equal value, the point assignments 
will have to be adjusted (Brams and Taylor 1999: 102). By systematic introspection into 
the importance of the issues, these methods show how a party can determine the relative 
utility value of the various issues.20  
Giving weight to the different forms of utility and estimating the risks and discount 
factors of the items may be complicated for a party. However, as parties of negotiations 
usually do work out priorities of the issues, it is reasonable to assume that parties can 
work out a ranking of the issues and weight the intensity of their preferences. However, 
agreeing internally on a certain point allocation may be hard as parties of a conflict 
seldom are internally monolithic and the values on the same side may differ sharply 
(Raiffa 1982: 12). Point allocation by the party itself may thus be a disputed process, 
which may either mean that point allocation in relation to the AW procedure is not 
acceptable for the parties, or that point allocation will be a top elite project.  
If point allocation is going to be carried out by a mediator or a researcher, the actual 
priorities of the parties and the divergent views of the parties must also be handled. This 
can by done by setting up assumptions on what are the leading utility preferences of a 
                                              
20
 See Thomas L. Saaty (1995) for an additional method for comparing the importance of the issues, called “Analytic hierarchy 
processing”.  
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 party and base the AW procedure on these assumptions. The assumptions can be altered 
by different understandings of utility values, giving new models of fair division. For 
instance can it be made explicit what goals a player may seek to maximize and then try to 
outline what utility values the weight of the different goals will result in (see Denoon and 
Brams 1997). As sources for point allocation, mediators or researchers can base estimated 
utility values on interviews with the parties, documents and statements by the parties, or 
third-party reports. The validity of the point allocation method may be strengthened if 
several qualified persons take part in it. One example of third party point allocation was 
carried out by Massoud (2000). He asked researchers who have specialized on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict to rate the importance of each issue on a scale from 1-6. Based on a 
mean and median of ratings, the relative value of each issue was calculated.21
In the hypothetical application of the AW procedure, I suggest an ordinal ranking of the 
issues. This is based on a brief comparison of the issues, where I try to give reasons for 
and use the statements from the interviews of why winning on one or more issues seem to 
be of greater importance for a party, while winning on other issues seem to be of less 
importance for a party. Further, the ordinal rankings of the issues are transformed into 
cardinal utilities from 0-100. I do this by expressing the ordinal ranking of the issues by 
giving them points according to how they are ranked, where issues ranked at top are given 
four points, issues ranked second are given three points, and so on. Then these “ordinal 
ranking points” are used as a basis for a calculation of additive scores by dividing the 
ordinal ranking point of an issue with the sum of the ordinal ranking points and then 
multiply by a 100: 
Utility value of issue = [ordinal ranking point of issue / sum of ordinal ranking points of 
issues] * 100 
                                              
21 Such an “expert survey” was developed for this project as well, but the collected survey schemes turned out to be unreliable as 
a basis for value assignments of the issues of wealth sharing. The set of issues in the survey schemes was incomplete when given 
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 This way of transforming an ordinal ranking of the issues to a 100 point scale is inspired 
by Massoud (2000).  As an alternative to using this formula of transforming the ordinal 
ranking into cardinal utility values, I could have systematically compared the issues and 
suggested additative scores from 0-100. However, such a process would involve quite a 
lot of speculation and is not carried out. That does not mean that the formula I apply 
involves any less speculation on the preferences of the parties. The formula is applied as it 
is a way of simply creating additative scores out of an ordinal ranking, in a hypothetical 
application of the AW procedure for research purposes, where the ratings do not 
necessarily have to represent the exact preferences of the parties (assuming that the 
parties had exact preferences).  
2.4 Research design limitations 
The ultimate aim of this thesis is to identify the general preconditions that have to be met 
in order to apply the AW procedure to civil war negotiations. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the ideal research strategy for identifying preconditions of the AW 
procedure is to apply it to a real-world situation and then investigate what conditions were 
present in the talks when the AW procedure could be applied successfully and what 
conditions were present in the talks when its application failed. Then a systematic pattern 
of specific preconditions can be singled out on the basis of various peace negotiations. As 
a real-world application of the AW procedure has not been carried out and only one case 
of negotiation is explored in this thesis, the potential for establishing robust preconditions 
of such a nature is limited.  
Instead, the research design of this thesis allows for proposing plausible preconditions for 
applying the AW procedure to civil war negotiations. The preconditions of the AW 
procedure identified in this thesis may be truly generalizable if they have been correctly 
                                                                                                                                                  
to the respondents, several respondents resisted to rank the issues properly, and those who carried out the scheme did it very 
roughly. There were thus few replies and these replies seemed unreliable. 
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 identified in the case of the IGAD talks, and if the negotiations on wealth sharing with 
their issues, settings and actors have relevant characteristics that are found in other cases 
of civil war negotiations (Andersen 1997: 132-136). Regarding the extent to which the 
preconditions have been correctly identified in the thesis, the combination of the case 
study based on different data sources and the hypothetical application of the AW 
procedure, represents at least a certain basis for highlighting what would have been 
requirements for applying the AW procedure in the case of the IGAD talks.  
Regarding the question of whether the IGAD talks as a case have characteristics that are 
relevant for other cases of civil war negotiations, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
parties in other civil war negotiations have many of the same concerns of applying a 
formal procedure as the parties in the IGAD talks. For instance are all parties in civil war 
negotiations likely to be highly concerned about the situation on the battlefield, internal 
demands, the strategy of the mediators and international pressure. Particularly in 
negotiations involving two parties at the table, the same constraints and opportunities may 
be found in regard to the prospects of applying the AW procedure.  
 34
 3 Theoretical investigation 
A variety of normative principles can be applied to attain a fair or a just outcome of a civil 
war conflict. Based on the justice-of-war tradition, specific criteria for ius post bellum 
(justice after war) are relevant for a civil war conflict. Henrik Syse (2003: 153-4) suggests 
six criteria for ius post bellum: (1) There must be a just reason for ending the war, 
meaning that the injustice in which the war was fought against is ended by peace, (2) the 
parties involved in the peacemaking must be considered legitimate authority, (3) the 
parties involved in the fighting must reach clear and binding settlements, (4) security 
guarantees must be established, especially for civilians in the post-conflict situation, (5) 
transitional justice addressing criminals of war from all parties must be carried out, and a 
redistribution of property and resources which is perceived as fair for all parties must be 
accomplished, and (6) a reconciliation process must be established to build confidence 
between former enemies.  
In civil war negotiations, parties or mediators may argue for a certain settlement by 
referring to these criteria for ius post bellum, though the criteria are quite general. A 
related standard of justice which is more specific in what arrangements should be 
established by a peace deal is international law and human rights.22 However, human 
rights and particularly demands of self-determination and freedom of religion are in many 
cases highly contestable by the parties when concretized into a specific form of fair 
division. The normative principles of human rights are often intertwined with the conflict 
itself and the power interests of the involved parties may be seriously threatened by a 
realization of these criteria of a fair or just ending of a war.  
Brams and Taylor’s approach to the problem of fair division and the AW procedure 
particularly may be an acceptable way of concretizing Syse’s criteria (3) (the parties 
                                              
22
 See C. Bell’s Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000) for how arguments of human rights and transitional justice have 
been introduced in peace talks, but in different ways were manifested into peace agreements.  
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 involved in the fighting must reach clear and binding settlements) and (5) (a redistribution 
of property and resources which is perceived as fair for all parties must be carried out) for 
a just ending of wars.  Brams and Taylor investigate how a fair division of conflicts in 
general can be created based on the satisfaction of utility. They set up explicit criteria (or 
properties) that characterize notions of fairness, such as proportionality, envy-freeness, 
equitability and efficiency.23 Then they provide a step-by-step procedure that show how 
the criteria of fairness can be obtained given a set of issues and different utility rankings.  
They present different procedures of fair division, which satisfy different criteria of 
fairness, involve unlike number of players and are based on different representations of 
preferences (Brams and Taylor 1996).24  
As mentioned in the introduction, the Adjusted Winner (AW) procedure is particularly 
interesting as a procedure for transforming an unstructured bargaining situation into an 
arguably fair settlement as it is theoretically preferable to other techniques of fair division, 
such as strict alternation and divide-and-choose. This is because the solutions created by 
the AW procedure satisfy all three properties of envy-freeness, equitability and efficiency 
at the same time (Brams and Taylor 1996: chap 4). Especially the characteristic of envy-
freeness seems attractive as minimizing envy in a settlement has been identified as an 
important factor for resolving different types of conflicts (Brams and Taylor 1996: 4).25  
                                              
23
 “Proportionality” can be defined as “an allocation where every one of n players thinks he or she received a portion that has a 
size or value of at least 1/n” (Brams and Taylor 1996: 244). For definitions on envy-freeness, equitability and efficiency, see 
chapter 1. 
24
 Regarding the definition of “fairness”, Brams and Taylor (1996: 241) claims that “a procedure is fair to the degree that it 
satisfies certain properties (e.g. proportionality, envy-freeness, efficiency, equitability, or invulnerability to manipulation), 
enabling each player to achieve a certain level of satisfaction with a guarantee strategy”. 
25
 “Envy” can be defined as “a feeling of discontented or resentful longing aroused by someone else's possessions” (New Oxford 
Dictionary) or “a painful or resentful awareness of an advantage enjoyed by another joined with a desire to possess the same 
advantage” (Webster). 
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 3.1 The Adjusted Winner (AW) procedure 
The AW procedure can be applied primarily to conflicts over goods or issues between two 
parties, though Brams and Taylor (1996: 80-3) demonstrate how the procedure also can 
be applied to cases with three or more parties. The procedure can be used by parties with 
the goal of solving a conflict, or it can be used as a tool for analyzing conflicts and 
prescribing solutions (see chapter 1.1 on what can be meant by application of the 
procedure). 
The procedure starts with designating the goods and issues of the dispute. There is some 
distinction between goods and issues, but they can be referred to as items. Goods are 
typically physical objects, while issues are matters on which there are opposing positions, 
such as Islamic law versus secularism in a state and religion conflict. Most important for 
dispute resolution is whether the goods or issues can realistically be split or shared 
without losing their value (Brams and Taylor 1999: 9). The second stage of the AW 
procedure is therefore to state whether the goods or issues can be divided or not and in 
what way they eventually can be split.  
Next each party is given 100 points which are distributed across the goods or issues. The 
distribution of points is based on an allocation of the relative utility value which each 
party places on the different items. Utility is defined as “the numerical value indicating 
the player’s degree of preference for that item or portion” (Brams and Taylor 1996: 246). 
If for instance a party regards four items equally important, it will allocate 25 points to 
each item (Brams and Taylor 1999: 11). If a party regards one item of major importance, 
for instance it allocates 50 points to this item and distributes the rest of points (50) to the 
other items. 
The items are then divided among the parties on the basis of the following procedure 
(Brams and Taylor 1996: chap. 4): 
1. Initially, the parties win the items for which they have allocated more points. 
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 2. If the total number of points won by each party is equal, then the procedure ends.  
3. If one party gets more points than the other, then “equitability adjustments” have to 
be carried out so each party has an equal number of points acquired. The 
adjustment is carried out with sharing the divisible item controlled by the party 
with the most points, which also is characterized by the lowest ratio of ranking 
between the two parties.  
4. If the parties still have an unequal satisfaction of points, the procedure moves on to 
the next issue with the next-lowest ratio, and so on.  
This procedure can be illustrated with a simple example (adopted from Massoud 2000). 
Two parties disagree on three issues in which all are divisible. The parties point allocate 
utility values as listed in table 3.1 below.  
Table 3.1: An example of point allocation of utility in a conflict involving two parties 
and three issues. 
Issue Party 1 utility 
Party 2 
utility 
Issue 1 20 10 
Issue 2 20 50
Issue 3 60 40 
Total points allocated 100 100 
Initial points satisfied 80 50 
Points satisfied after equalization adjustments 62 62 
 
As Party 1 has ranked issue 1 and 3 higher than Party 2, it wins on these issues. Party 2 
wins on issue 2 and has only 50 points satisfied compare to Party 1’s 80 points. To 
achieve equitability, some points have to be transferred from Party 1 to Party 2. Which of 
the winning issues of Party 1 should be shared? Issue 3 has a lower winner-loser ratio (60 
/ 40 = 1.5) than issue 1 (20 / 10 = 2). Parts of issue 3 will therefore be transferred to Party 
2. How much of issue 3 must be transferred to Party 2 to equalize satisfaction? If x is the 
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 fraction of issue 3 that Party 1 will keep and 1-x is the rest transferred to Party 2, then an 
equation can be set for determining the share given to Party 1 vs. Party 2 (Party 1 is on the 
left side of the equation and Party 2 on the right side): 
20 + 60 (x) = 50 + 40 (1 - x) 
60x + 40x = 50 + 40 – 20 
x = 0.7 
Party 1 retains 70 percent of issue 3 and keeps issue 1, giving it 62 points (20 + 0.7 * 60). 
Party 2 is given 30 percent of issue 3 in addition to issue 2 and gains a total of 62 points 
(50 + 0.3 * 40).  
Are the outcomes equitable, efficient and envy-free? As each party is given equal amount 
of points satisfied, the outcomes are equitable. More important, each party has won on the 
issues it values most and has no reason to envy the other. Finally, it can be showed that 
there are no other outcomes which will give the parties more points satisfied and at the 
same time being envy-free and equitable. Three important criteria of fair division 
(equitability, envy-freeness and efficiency) seem to be met (Massoud 2000: 336).   
It is important to notice that if the criteria of equitability, envy-freeness and efficiency are 
to be met, the ratings of the parties have to correspond to their preferences. If the 
procedure is carried out by the parties themselves, their announced values may involve 
strategic considerations and not necessarily reflect their preferences. It might be tempting 
for the parties to estimate the point allocation of the other party and then be “economical” 
in the distribution of their own points in order to win on most issues possible, instead of 
allocating points directly corresponding to its own preferences. Although a party with 
complete information can exploit another party without such information, Brams and 
Taylor show that a strategy of not announcing truthful points is likely to fail in practice as 
it easily leads to backlash. If one party chooses to not be truthful about its allocation of 
points and the other party also chooses such a strategy, both parties easily end up with a 
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 division which is much worse than a settlement based on their true preferences (Brams 
and Taylor 1999: 79-83, 145).  
Although the criterion of envy-freeness is attractive in settling disputes, there may be 
reasons for finding a division which is not envy-free, for instance if one party should be 
entitled to a greater share of the total utility. A settlement can be created by giving a 
certain share of the total utility points to each party. The procedure is carried out in the 
same manner as for an envy-free solution, but adjustments have to be carried out by 
transferring issues with lowest winner-loser ratio from one party to the other until a 
settlement with a set share of utility points is produced. By applying the AW procedure 
with unequal entitlements, the parties receive more utility points than their entitlements 
(as a percentage), but envy-freeness is not ensured as one party receives a greater share 
than the other (Brams and Taylor 1996: 70).  
3.2 Specific assumptions of the AW procedure 
Having presented how the AW procedure theoretically can provide parties with a 
settlement which is envy-free, equitable and efficient, some specific assumptions of the 
AW procedure should be looked into. An application of the AW procedure relies on at 
least four specific assumptions: (1) The players are willing to point allocate the utility 
value of the different items (Brams and Taylor 1999: 11-12), (2) the players are unitary 
actors, (3) utility points are additive, and (4) utility points are linear (Brams and Taylor 
1996: 72). Below the above mentioned assumptions are briefly presented.  
3.2.1 The players are willing to point allocate the utility value of the different items 
In applying the AW procedure, the players are to assign points representing their 
preferences of winning on the different items. All items may be of equal importance for a 
player, or they may not. If a party is not willing to state how much it values certain items, 
the procedure can not be carried out by the parties (Brams and Taylor 1999: 10). A direct 
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 application of the AW procedure thus assumes a willingness of the parties to point 
allocate their subjective utility value of the issues.  
3.2.2 The players are unitary actors 
As mentioned in chapter 2.3, application of the AW procedure assumes that the players or 
parties internally can agree to a certain point allocation and thereby accept an agreement 
as fair. However, parties of a civil war are almost never internally homogenous and that 
may represent a serious challenge in applying the AW procedure to civil war negotiations. 
Especially if all factions of a party must approve the deal, or if any faction may be a 
“spoiler”, heterogeneity may be an obstacle to applying the AW procedure (Wood 2004: 
16). However, heterogeneity may be more of a general problem of peace negotiations 
than of applying the AW procedure specifically. 
3.2.3 Additivity 
It will be hard to allocate the utility value of items for a party, if the utility of one item is 
highly related to the utility of another item. Two items may not be “separable” if they are 
complementary in giving utility. For instance in a conflict over banking and currency in a 
divided country, if currency (one or two) and central bank (one or two) are regarded as 
two different issues, the utility of winning on the issue of currency is highly dependent of 
what arrangements of central bank is created and who wins on that issue. In such an 
example and if winning on one issue affects the value of the other issue, there is a lack of 
additivity of the player’s utilities. Additivity means that “the utility of two or more goods 
to a player, is equal to the sum of their points” (Brams and Taylor 1996: 72). Lack of 
additivity may be handled by joining two items and letting the parties rate them as one 
item. In many cases it is problematic to assume perfect additivity, but “weak additivity” 
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 of the most important issues is probably satisfactory for a fruitful application in real-life 
situations.26
3.2.4 Linearity 
In the equitability adjustment of the AW procedure, one or more items will have to be 
divided. This is to make sure that each party receives an equal amount of their points or 
utilities. The division of items assumes that the player’s marginal utilities of the item are 
constant (“linearity”). However, the perceived change in utility value may be far greater 
for a part getting 1/5 of an issue instead of nothing (for instance of oil fields), compare to 
a party who looses 1/5 of the same issue but still has 4/5 left. The total subjective utility 
value gained by the two parties may then not be equal, leading to a real-life settlement in 
which does not correspond to the party’s point allocated preferences (Brams and Taylor 
1996: 72). However, whether the total gain of utility value may be unequal after 
equitability adjustments is dependent upon what type of item is divided and how the 
eventual division of an issue is carried out.  
3.3 General assumptions of applying the AW procedure to civil war conflicts 
The applicability of the AW procedure to civil war conflicts is the focus of this thesis. 
The AW procedure must therefore be investigated in relation to the context of ending civil 
wars. As an analytical framework for such an investigation, I rely on an article by Barbara 
Walter (2002) in which she argues that ending civil wars by negotiations can be 
conceptualized as a three staged process. As a first stage the parties have to attend 
negotiations, secondly the parties have to sign a bargain, and thirdly this bargain has to be 
successfully implemented. At these stages, different factors are important for the 
proceedings of the resolution process (Walter 2002).  
                                              
26
 “Weak additivity” can be defined as a case in which “a player’s preferences, whenever he or she prefers A to B and C to D, 
and there is no overlap between A and C, prefers A together with C to B together with D” (Brams and Taylor 1996: 247). 
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 An application of the AW procedure particularly regards the progress of Walter’s stage 
two and three of the resolution process.27 The question is then whether the AW procedure, 
which provides the parties with an arguably fair settlement, can contribute positively to 
the progress of these two stages of conflict resolution. In stage two, can the AW 
procedure with its properties of fairness facilitate the signing of a bargain? For stage 
three, will a settlement based on the AW procedure increase the chances for a successful 
implementation of the agreement? These questions and the stages of conflict resolution 
suggest that an application of the AW procedure to a civil war negotiation relies on at 
least three assumptions: (1) That the parties in a civil war attend negotiations, (2) that the 
AW procedure can play a constructive role in such negotiations, and (3) that a settlement 
based on the AW procedure can increase the chances for a successful implementation of 
the agreement.  
Also, if the AW procedure is to be applied by the parties themselves in a civil war 
negotiation, an application of the AW procedure assumes that the parties can accept to 
bind themselves to a procedure in a negotiation process, and that such a procedural 
arbitration will not negatively affect a successful implementation of the agreement.28 
Below I investigate these general assumptions of the AW procedure and on the basis of 
the assumptions suggest some theoretical preconditions of applying the AW procedure.  
                                              
27
 It can also be argued that a settlement suggested by the AW procedure by a third party can encourage the parties to attend 
negotiations as the framework for an agreement is clarified. For instance, Brams and Denoon (1997) do suggest how the Spratly 
Islands controversy can be resolved, and this may be one factor in facilitating negotiations. 
28
 Brams and Taylor (1996: 7) claim that the AW procedure can be classified as “a fair division procedure”, as “it leaves to the 
disputants themselves what procedure, if any, they will adopt”. At the same time they notice that once a procedure is chosen, the 
solution suggested under it “is binding in the same manner as an arbitrator’s choice is binding”.  The AW procedure can also be 
labeled as an “arbitration procedure”, which Young (1991: 8) defines as a “formal process that the parties submit to as an 
alternative to negotiating in an unstructured way”. However, it is important to distinguish the AW procedure from arbitration by 
an arbitrator, who makes a decision that the disputants must accept (Brams and Taylor 1996: 7).  
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 3.3.1 Parties of a civil war attend negotiations 
Under what conditions do parties of a civil war attend negotiations? As less than 20 
percent of the civil wars after 1940 have ended in a negotiated settlement (Walter 2002: 
5-6), there is both a pattern that parties of a civil war do not attend negotiations and that 
eventually such negotiations fail. Several attempts have been made to explain why parties 
in a civil war do not attend negotiations. It can be argued that in civil wars a moment in 
which the parties perceive the costs of fighting to outweigh the costs of negotiating rarely 
emerge.29 Factors such as asymmetrical power relations between the parties, lack of 
security guarantees after a settlement, internally polarized parties, external involvements 
and conflict over in-compromisable values are possible reasons for why such a moment 
does not occur in a civil war.  
One influential contribution to the study of when and how civil wars end by negotiations 
is I. William Zartman’s concept of ripeness.  Zartman argues that a civil war is ripe for 
mediation when there is a “mutually hurting stalemate”, that means “a moment when 
things will significantly get worse if they have not gotten better in ways that negotiations 
seeks to define” (Zartman 1983: 353). This is a situation in which the parties sense a crisis 
and have to reevaluate their strategy towards military victory. Thus, the presence of a 
mutually beneficial settlement, for instance developed by the AW procedure, is not 
sufficient for parties to opt for negotiations. There has to exist some kind of crisis where 
each side perceives that it can not win on the battlefield, or at least that engaging in 
negotiations will be beneficial in the shorter run. Third parties or potential mediators can 
be influential in changing the perception of the parties towards the gains of negotiations, 
for instance through economic and military rewards and punishments (Zartman 1983).  In 
addition mediators can be decisive by putting pressure on the parties and establish a 
setting in which negotiations can occur.  
                                              
29
 See for instance Stedman 1991, Zartman 1985, 1995 and Licklider 1993. 
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 While the presence of a costly military stalemate has been identified as a necessary and 
sometimes sufficient condition for negotiations to be initiated, researchers have claimed 
that other conditions are also central for negotiations to occur. Conciliatory leaders who 
are willing to negotiate is one factor and the presence of a strong center fraction inside a 
party is another factor which may be decisive for whether negotiations are initiated 
(Walter 1994). Thus, these two conditions add to the conditions of a mutually hurting 
stalemate and international pressure which this brief investigation has identified as 
important factors for negotiations to occur in a civil war.  
3.3.2 The AW procedure’s as a method of reaching a bargain 
Having assumed that parties of a civil war may attend negotiations under certain 
conditions, there is a question as to what induces parties to sign an agreement in civil war 
negotiations and whether an application of the AW procedure can facilitate the signing of 
a bargain. While numerous factors are likely to influence the parties’ decision to finally 
sign a bargain, in this chapter I do focus on a general factor commonly applied in 
negotiation analysis: Parties will only sign a bargain if they perceive the gains of the 
bargain to be greater than the reversion point of breaking the negotiations, like going back 
to war in a civil war negotiation (Young 1991: 3). Further, I will assume that the AW 
procedure is most likely to be legitimately introduced if there is a deadlock or a crisis in 
the negotiations. Before discussing whether the AW procedure and its properties of 
fairness can be attractive for parties and stimulate the progress of peace talks, some 
assumed characteristics of the dynamics of civil war negotiations have to be presented. 
It can be assumed that civil war negotiations in general are likely to develop into tug-of-
war negotiations as the parties are bitter enemies and do have few reasons to trust each 
other. In tug-of-war negotiations the interests of the parties seem to be irreconcilable and 
each party wants to get a best possible outcome regardless of the other party’s needs 
(definition adopted from Underdal 2001: 307-8). This type of negotiation can be 
contrasted to negotiations of a highly cooperative nature where the parties have a clear 
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 preference for joint problem-solving aimed at an efficient and fair outcome (Midgaard 
1993: 199-200).  
One aspect of tug-of-war negotiations is that the parties may have several good reasons to 
apply a hard strategy where they hold on to their positions and are less interested in 
compromising (Midgaard 1993: 201). One good reason for holding on to a specific 
position may be that a party’s constituencies at home may have strong expectations as to a 
specific outcome. A negotiator is likely to exploit such expectations as well as arguments 
of fairness for committing to different positions. Further, a party may invest great prestige 
in getting a particular outcome, or on avoiding another outcome. As the perceived costs of 
leaving a prestigious position tend to increase during bargaining, the process of 
bargaining itself is by this mechanism likely to generate incitements which reward a hard 
strategy (Underdal 2001: 306-7).  
In a situation where the parties have developed hard strategies, they may have great 
problems in taking the necessary steps towards available solutions. As steps towards a 
compromise or an alternative solution to those the parties hold on to can be attributed as 
weakness, the parties may choose to hold on to their positions although they risk a 
breakdown of the negotiations. In a game theoretic sense, such a situation is similar to a 
“chicken” game. If there are two parties at the negotiation table, either one of the parties 
has to give up its position to get a deal or the parties have to converge their positions into 
one alternative outcome that both perceive as less beneficial than the position they are 
holding on to with a hard strategy.  
One possible course of negotiations where a situation similar to a chicken game has 
developed is that the party who perceives that it has little to win compare to what it will 
lose when holding on to the position, finally must yield or make a concession (Midgaard 
1993: 318). Alternatively, the negotiations will break down as the parties hold on to their 
positions and is not willing to give in (for instance due to the process generated 
incitements mentioned above).  
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 Another alternative course of negotiations where a situation of a deadlock has developed 
is that the parties through a successful coordination of expectations and choices arrive at 
an acceptable outcome (Schelling 1960). Mediation may be central to coordinating 
expectations and choices. By putting forward proposals and applying various forms of 
leverage mediators may manage to stimulate the parties to agree to an outcome instead of 
a breakdown of the negotiations.30 While mediation strategies of building confidence, 
putting pressure on the parties and providing neutral information are central to dealing 
with a deadlocked situation, I will here focus on the potential of introducing the AW 
procedure as a key for resolving a deadlock as described above.  
One reason why the AW procedure may be a tool for resolving a deadlock is that its 
criteria of fairness are attractive and salient. Young (1991: 25-6) argues that the problem 
of converging on one outcome in bargaining is strongly attached to the issue of fairness. 
By introducing and appealing to standards of fairness, negotiators sort out a specific range 
of solutions and delimit the number of disagreements. Of course there exist a number of 
possible standards of fairness, so the principles appealed to have to be unique or to some 
extent respected by both parties to be effective. Possibly the AW procedure may be 
relevant in some negotiations where other standards of fairness are hard to appeal to or 
highly contested. A deadlock facing the parties during negotiations may thus open up a 
room for the AW procedure as it provides a legitimate and an arguably method for 
converging on one outcome.  
However, the AW procedure will simply be an unacceptable method for addressing a 
crisis at the negotiation table if parties believe that they can get a better solution by 
appealing to other standards of fairness. Negotiating by appealing to other standards of 
fairness than the AW procedure, like historical guilt or proportionality, may also be more 
                                              
30
 “Leverage” can be defined as “an ability to favorably change the bargaining set” (Stedman 1991: 23). Lax and Sebenius (1986) 
suggest that such leverage can come from five sources: coercion (the “stick”), remuneration (the “carrot”), identification 
(“charisma”), normative conformity (appeal to values, principles , and norms), and knowledge (information). 
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 normatively acceptable for a party and its constituencies, than applying a procedure where 
the other party is given equal entitlements to subjective utility. In a bargaining situation 
between civil war contestants where the parties are bitter enemies and even recognition of 
the antagonist as a negotiating party is seen as a concession, accepting the other party’s 
right to a specified share of utility labeled as an equitable or envy-free portion of the 
issues may not be acceptable, at least not explicitly. However, it is likely that a moral 
objection to the AW procedure’s division of equal subjective utility values will be most 
relevant if it co-occurs with an expectation that greater gains can be achieved without the 
AW procedure.  
Given that the issues of a civil war negotiation can be handled by the AW procedure 
without violating the assumptions of additivity and linearity, it can be held that rational 
negotiators will accept the AW procedure as a method for resolving the conflict as long 
as their expected payoff of the AW produced deal is higher than both negotiating without 
the AW procedure and the payoff of breaking the negotiations. As the AW procedure 
provides parties with a guaranteed strategy in which they will be given a satisfaction of 
utility which is greater than half of their total utility and at the same time is efficient, the 
procedure has the potential to be attractive for rational actors and involve greater payoffs 
than negotiating without the procedure or breaking the negotiations. Particularly if both 
parties are insecure on how strong they really are in the negotiations, a neutral procedure 
with a certain guaranteed payoff may be tempting (assuming that applying the AW 
procedure is perceived as a safe strategy; will be discussed later).  
This implies that the greater the costs of returning back to war are for both parties, the 
greater are the chances that the AW procedure is acceptable as a method of reaching an 
agreement. The question is then whether the AW procedure in a context of civil war 
negotiations can be perceived as giving greater benefits than negotiating “freely”. Several 
aspects suggest that the condition where applying the AW procedure is perceived as 
giving greater payoffs than negotiating without the AW procedure and risk the return of 
war is hard to meet in civil war negotiations.  
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 Firstly, although negotiators of a civil war are likely to compare expected payoffs of 
different ways of handling the conflict, the payoffs are hard to define and uncertain. It is 
probably too much to assume that the shape and direct implication of a party’s utility 
frontier are fixed in the players’ imagination (Young 1991: 3). Thus, the condition of a 
rational actor in which compares the expected payoff of the AW procedure versus 
negotiating without the procedure or going back to war is likely to be complicated by 
different factors in real life. Aspects as unfamiliarity with the AW procedure, practical 
requirements of point allocation and cultural and individual preferences for negotiating 
without a formal procedure are likely to alternate the parties’ utility assessment of the AW 
procedure towards the conclusion that applying the AW procedure is less preferable than 
negotiating without it or breaking the negotiations.   
Secondly, the condition of parties who perceive their expected payoffs of applying the 
AW procedure to be greater than negotiating without the procedure is hard to meet if 
parties differ in their control of attractive endowments.31 A party controlling most 
attractive endowments may simply expect to get a great portion of the issues be playing 
hard on the endowments it controls and negotiate without the AW procedure. If party A is 
controlling several goods that party B assigns great value, party B will be willing to pay a 
high price to get a share of these goods. If there is an asymmetrical control of attractive 
endowments, meaning that A is controlling several goods that B finds attractive and party 
B is not controlling as many goods that A assigns great value, then party B must pay a 
higher price than A to get a desirable outcome (Underdal 2001: 309). According to this 
theoretical argument, A is not likely to accept a procedure where the issues are to be 
distributed equitably. As the government in a civil war conflict often controls several 
attractive endowments by its command over the state apparatus, this is highly relevant in 
a civil war negotiation.    
                                              
31
 “Endowments” can be defined as “the resources that a party controls when the negotiations start”. Such resources may be 
territorial (like control of an area), economic (like natural resources), and political (such as the government apparatus).   
 49
 However, a party with the least attractive endowments may compensate for its lack of 
endowments through a costly effort during the negotiations (Underdal 2001: 309). 
Arguing for the application of the AW procedure may be one strategy for a party of 
channeling a great effort towards a desirable outcome. For instance may a party of civil 
war negotiations be able to play on international support for an “equitable” settlement. A 
party may also manage to convince a party controlling more endowments that a procedure 
which establishes an equitable deal has greater chances of not being violated and thus 
give greater payoffs in the longer run. On the other hand, the benefits of such a repeated 
game are uncertain and in the future. It therefore seems as although there are reasons why 
the AW procedure may become acceptable for both parties in a situation of asymmetrical 
control of attractive endowments, it is most realistic to assume that there is a quite limited 
room for a party who controls less attractive endowments to argue for a procedure that 
establishes an equitable outcome.32  
Finally, practical issues are to a great extent likely to decide whether the AW procedure is 
an acceptable method for resolving a deadlock during civil war negotiations. The fairness 
principles of the AW procedure are intractably linked to the practical aspects of a strict 
sharing of point allocated utility. Although the principles of envy-freeness, equitability 
and efficiency are acceptable standards of fairness, they may be surrendered as of little 
attractiveness if the AW procedure can not be applied in an acceptable way. If the AW 
procedure is to be applied directly, one major practical obstacle is the requirement that the 
parties have to commit to a procedure with an uncertain outcome. I argue here that 
although parties may perceive the theoretical guarantees of envy-freeness, equitability and 
efficiency of the AW procedure as having a potential for creating a good outcome of the 
negotiations, they may in practice have great problems to accept a direct application of 
the procedure where the parties have to commit themselves to a procedure where the 
                                              
32
 This discussion assumes that the AW procedure in real life can establish a settlement which is equitable. However this 
assumption is problematized in chapter 6 in relation to the fact that the winning and sharing implications of the procedure have 
large implications for what settlement is created by the AW procedure. 
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 specific arrangements of the settlement is not known beforehand. Especially in civil war 
negotiations, where a peace situation will leave the parties with limited security 
guarantees, the parties may “fear the settlement” (Stedman 1991: 15, Walter 1994). It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that parties will maximize their control of what specific 
outcome the negotiations will lead to and that they will be highly skeptical to bind 
themselves to a procedure.  
A less binding application of the AW procedure can overcome this likely unwillingness of 
the parties to commit to arbitration by the procedure. If the AW procedure is applied 
indirectly, for instance by mediators who on the background of interviews with parties 
suggest an arguably fair outcome based on a procedure, the procedure may establish a 
constructive framework for further negotiations on what is a fair outcome. Especially if 
there is a deadlock in the negotiations and the parties still have an interest in resolving the 
conflict, the AW procedure may create a new drive towards a final bargain. 
It thus seems reasonable to conclude that if a mediator can present the outcome of the AW 
procedure as highly attractive in a rational sense (in giving all parties greater payoff than 
going back to war and hold on to their positions in a deadlock) and at the same time 
present the standards of fairness as normatively appealing, some form of an indirect 
application of the procedure can be acceptable and facilitate civil war negotiations 
towards the signing of a bargain. However, the discussion in this chapter has raised 
several objections to whether the AW procedure will be an acceptable method for 
reaching an agreement. Independently or in combination, factors such as perceived 
strength versus the opposing party, other appealing moral standards and practical 
reservations, may make even an indirect application of the AW procedure unacceptable.  
3.3.3 Fair division and successful implementation of the agreement 
Below I present some conditions which I assume are necessary for the implementation of 
civil war peace agreements in the uncertain post-conflict environment. Then I briefly 
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 discuss whether an AW produced deal with its properties of fairness is likely to meet 
these conditions.  
Elisabeth Wood (2004) argues that if some parties of a civil war have chosen to negotiate, 
it can be assumed that they are not capable of imposing a solution on the other party or 
parties. This relates to what Zartman (1983, 1985) refers to as a "mutually hurting 
stalemate" as a moment in which a civil war conflict can be mediated. Further, it is likely 
to assume that a third party can not implement a peace settlement that is not in the 
interests of both parties in the long run. This means, according to Wood (2004), that a 
necessary condition for the successful implementation of civil war peace agreements, is 
that adhering to the terms of the agreement is a Nash equilibrium; an outcome from which 
neither player have an incentive to depart unilaterally because his or her departure will 
lead to a worse, or at least not a better, outcome (Nash 1951). With such a settlement it 
will be in the interest of the parties to implement the agreement as long as the other party 
or parties also does. The question is then whether the AW procedure creates a settlement 
in which is a Nash equilibrium.  
Assuming that the AW procedure can be carried out in real-life and create a settlement 
that the parties immediately get a sense that the deal is procedurally fair, this may increase 
the chances of a successful implementation to the extent that such fairness creates a 
commitment of the parties toward the deal. A sense of procedurally fairness may in real-
life involve a sense that no other agreement would be better for one party without being 
worse for the other (efficiency) and that both parties received an equal portion of their 
subjective utility (equitability). Such feelings are likely to increase the party’s 
commitment to a deal when confronted with the heavy tasks of implementation. Thus as 
long as a party recognizes the other party’s right to an equal portion of subjective utility 
and get a sense of procedurally fairness by applying the AW procedure, an AW produced 
deal will contribute positively to a Nash equilibrium of implementing the deal. 
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 However, both the specific terms of the settlement and the extent of credible commitments 
to uphold the terms of the agreement are likely to be important factors determining the 
payoffs of the parties of sticking to the agreement and to what extent a peace agreement is 
a Nash equilibrium. Further, how the terms of the agreement come into play in the post-
conflict situation is dependent on a number of factors as global economic and political 
development, various efforts of peace building, natural incidences and choices of core 
actors in the post-conflict environment. The agreement and its terms must therefore be 
robust so it can uphold a Nash equilibrium in spite of the various uncertainties given by 
these factors.  
One critical point related to whether an AW produced settlement is a Nash equilibrium, is 
that it is not guaranteed that a settlement created by the AW procedure establish credible 
commitments for the parties to adhere to the terms of the agreement. For instance has the 
presence of security guarantees been identified as one important condition for the parties 
to commit to the terms of civil war peace agreements (Walter 2002). Will the AW 
procedure produce a solution with such guarantees? Logically, the AW procedure will let 
the parties win on the issues in which they value most and thus security issues may be 
settled in a way such that none of the parties will depart. However, whether this will 
involve sufficient self-enforcing mechanisms and/or third party security support is not 
guaranteed by the application of the AW procedure.33 That shows that if the application of 
the AW procedure is to lead to a successful implementation of the deal, some form of 
credible commitments must be guaranteed by the winning and losing implications of the 
procedure. Thus the role of the mediators is critical as they have to encourage such 
winning and losing implications as well as ensure that sufficient third party support is 
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 Hovi (1998: 85) describes an agreement as ‘self-enforcing’ if it satisfies two conditions: “The first is that each contracting 
party complies as long as everyone else does so. The second is that no external mechanism is needed to ensure compliance.” Hovi 
(1998: 77-8) also notes that establishing a self-enforcing agreement can be highly complicated, but that three mechanisms are 
likely to ‘enforce’ an agreement: “A first possibility is that, even in the short run, there is no incentive for anyone to violate the 
agreement, given that the other parties comply as well. Second, it may be the case that at least one of the parties wants to defect, 
but is simply incapable of doing so. Third, even if some of the parties are tempted to defect, they may refrain from doing so for 
fear that a violation could motivate other signatories to suspend or even terminate the agreement”. 
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 provided in economic, political and security matters (see also Brams and Taylor 1999: 
104). 
Wood (2004) shows that if parties perceive issues to be of less divisibility (assuming that 
issues differ in degrees of divisibility), a peace settlement is likely to be less robust. That 
means that if the issue treated by the equalization adjustments of the AW procedure is 
perceived as of little divisibility by one or more parties, the settlement created by the AW 
procedure will be less robust. However, that does not mean that a settlement created by 
the AW procedure will not lead to a robust settlement, but means that if there are 
alternative issues which should be treated by the equalization adjustments, the issue 
which is perceived of highest divisibility should be divided. Possibly, an issue which is 
perceived as of higher divisibility, but which involves a higher winner-loser ratio may be 
a better choice by a mediator in carrying out the equalization adjustments, although it will 
lead to fewer points satisfied for the parties. As the ultimate goal of applying the AW 
procedure is not to get a deal, but to establish a deal with the greatest chances of a 
successful implementation, this consideration may be important.  
3.3.4 Summing up the theoretical investigation  
This brief investigation into general assumptions of an application of the AW procedure 
to civil war negotiations has first looked into when parties of a civil war are most likely to 
attend negotiations. The investigation suggested that some kind of a “mutually hurting 
stalemate” is a central condition for parties of a civil war to enter into negotiations. 
Secondly, the theoretical investigation has clarified that if the AW procedure with its 
criteria of fairness shall be acceptable in civil war negotiations, both parties must be 
convinced that their payoff of applying the procedure will be higher than both the 
expected payoff of going back to war and the expected payoff of negotiating without the 
AW procedure. This seems to be a definite precondition of applying the AW procedure. If 
there is an asymmetrical control of attractive endowments or if one party views the 
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 sharing of equal subjective utility as normatively unacceptable, it may be hard to meet 
this precondition.  
Another aspect in which has been raised was the practical issue of whether parties in a 
civil war conflict are likely to bind themselves to a procedure as a method of resolving the 
conflict. Although the AW procedure may be seen as a neutral and safe strategy in a 
situation of a deadlock, it seems most realistic to assume that a direct application of the 
AW procedure is unacceptable for the parties. This is because they by a direct application 
of the procedure are not in full control of what specific arrangements the negotiations will 
lead to. An indirect application of the AW procedure is probably more acceptable and can 
eventually be applied by mediators as a framework for suggesting a fair agreement. 
However, as the investigation into whether the AW produced deal can increase the 
chances for a successful implementation of the agreements showed, a third party or a 
mediator must ensure that credible commitments like self-enforcing mechanisms are built 
into the winning implications of the procedure and additional third-party support is 
provided if necessary to implement the agreement.  
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 4 The negotiations on wealth sharing of the IGAD talks 
We have suffered so much, we cannot compromise34  
In this chapter I analyze the negotiations on wealth sharing between the Government of 
Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) which took 
place between August 2002 and January 2004. I concentrate on answering the following 
questions: 
- What were the issues of wealth sharing? 
- How were the issues addressed? 
- What were the positions of the parties to the issues?35 
- What was the role of the mediators and the resource persons during the 
negotiations? 
One aim of this analysis is to get the information needed for a hypothetical application of 
the AW procedure to the issues of wealth sharing. Investigations into the first three 
questions serve this aim. Another aim of this case study is to investigate the course of the 
negotiations and the role of the mediators to identify practical preconditions of applying 
the AW procedure to civil war negotiations.  
The bargaining process is likely to have influenced on how the issues were addressed and 
how the positions of the parties developed. However, as it is hard to get reliable 
                                              
34
 A common saying in the SPLA/M delegation during the negotiations (Stiansen 2004 [interview]). 
35 When investigating the positions of the parties I first present the communicated positions of the parties at the negotiation table. 
Then I try to on the background of what became the paragraphs of the agreement state what that indicates on the importance of 
the communicated positions and the issues for the parties (see chapter 2.2.1). 
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 information on how this process developed, this analysis does only to a minor degree 
cover the bargaining dynamics between the parties during the negotiations.  
4.1 The course of the negotiations on wealth sharing 
The rejuvenated IGAD initiative led to talks between the GOS and the SPLA/M in May 
2002 in Machakos (Kenya).36 The issues of wealth sharing were discussed as well as 
other issues. However, the mediators decided upon a strategy where the core issues of 
self-determination and state and religion were addressed first. It was clear that these 
issues had to be resolved before real progress could be made in other issues. The parties 
accepted this order of the issues and with the signing of the Machakos protocol in July 
2002, where principles for the resolution of the issues of self-determination and state and 
religion were agreed to, a framework for further negotiations in the issues of power 
sharing, wealth sharing, security and ultimately The Three Areas were established.37 
Under the auspices of IGAD and the leadership of General Lazarus Sumbeiwyo, 
committees were formed to work out acceptable solutions to the different issues. In 
addition to mediators from the IGAD countries, the United States, Great Britain and 
Norway (the “troika”), and Italy were actively involved as international observers. Later 
in the process the United Nations and the African Union obtained observer status. 
                                              
36 The IGAD initiative dates back to the Declaration of Principles (“DOP”) in 1994, when IGAD’s members, particularly 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, proposed either self-determination for Southern Sudan through a referendum, or a united secular country as a 
basis for resolving Sudan’s civil war. The government of Sudan was military stronger than the SPLA/M at the time and did not 
accept the initiative in 1994, but in 1997 it accepted the DOP as a basis for negotiating with the SPLA/M. However, the IGAD 
initiative was partly parked by the Egypt-Libyan initiative in 1999 which had a united Sudan as a basis for resolving the civil war 
(Johnson 2003: 174-7). The IGAD initiative was revitalised during the spring 2002 when the parties agreed to meet in Machakos, 
and finally agreed to the Machakos protocol. There are a number of factors which can explain the signing of the Machakos 
protocol, among others, re-unification of Southern groups, stalemate on the ground, US war on terrorism, a clarification of the 
concept of self-determination for the South following the Danforth peace effort, and the efforts of General Sumbeiwyo and the 
IGAD secretariat for peace in the Sudan (see ICG 2002b: 5-8, Johnson 2003: 174-9 and Dagne 2003: 2-9 ). 
37
 From the beginning of the IGAD talks, the SPLA/M strongly argued that The Three Areas as an issue should be a part of the 
talks. The GOS did not accept to include The Three Areas as an issue of the IGAD talks, but agreed to negotiate this issue under 
the auspices of the Kenyan government. However, during the talks in Naivasha in September 2003 The Three Areas as an issue 
became integrated with the IGAD talks (Stiansen 2004 [interview]). 
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 A technical committee on wealth sharing under the IGAD peace initiative had met on 
occasions since 2000 and discussed issues of wealth sharing. The signing of the 
Machakos protocol enabled the parties to focus on how to specifically address the 
economic issues of Sudan during a half year pre-interim period and a six year interim 
period (GOS informant 2004 [interview]). The stated aim of the Machakos protocol is 
unity of the country (Machakos protocol: Part A), but the political structure of Sudan that 
would follow the negotiations was contested. While some representatives of the SPLA/M 
claimed that the Machakos protocol outlines a confederal political structure and argued 
for economic arrangements following such a political framework (SPLA/M informant 
2004 [interview]), the representatives from the GOS argued that the protocol outlines a 
strong federal solution within a national framework. This meant that in some issues of 
wealth sharing the positions of the parties differed greatly. However, the chief mediator 
General Sumbeiwyo emphasized that the central aims of the talks were to give national 
unity a chance and make unity attractive. According to him, the range of bargaining in the 
talks did not, strictly speaking, include confederal solutions which would establish de 
facto two states and pre-empt the outcome of the referendum (Stiansen 2004 [interview]).  
In October and November 2002 talks were held between the parties focusing on a wide 
range of issues relating to power and wealth sharing arrangements. Deliberations of 
wealth sharing included issues as ownership of land and revenue sharing. The issues were 
addressed in broad terms and significant disagreements stood clear at this time. However, 
a “Memorandum of understanding between The Government of the Sudan (GOS) and The 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA/M) on aspects of structures of 
government” was signed in November 2002 as a general framework for further talks on 
power and wealth sharing. 
In January-February 2003 a major session was held in Karen (Kenya) to negotiate further 
on wealth and power sharing, building on the Memorandum of Understanding. During 
this round representatives from the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) assisted the parties in finding some arrangements on the sharing of wealth 
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 (these representatives as well as other experts who were brought in to assist the parties 
and the mediators are later referred to as the “resource persons”). According to the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) (2003b: 14), these representatives introduced technical 
expertise, pragmatism and case studies from other countries dealing with similar issues, 
which led to high progress in the negotiations on wealth sharing. The consultancy of the 
IMF and WB representatives seemed to structure the negotiations on wealth sharing in a 
way in which the parties could focus on a limited number of disagreements and build on 
some common understanding on how to address the issues (Deng 2004 [interview]).   
By May 2003 the GOS and the SPLA/M had held several rounds of talks confined to 
specific committees. Although there had been incremental progress on some issues, there 
had been no agreement on the major themes of power sharing, wealth sharing, security, or 
the contested areas of Abyei, the South Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. The IGAD 
mediators therefore changed its focus on the specific issues to a “holistic” approach where 
all of the outstanding issues where presented together. The aim of the new approach was 
to suggest trade-offs between the outstanding issues and enable the parties to reach a final 
agreement (ICG 2003c: 3). In early July 2003, the “holistic” approach manifested when 
the mediators presented “the Nakuru Protocol, Draft Framework for the resolution of 
outstanding issues arising out of the elaborations of the Machakos protocol” (hereafter the 
“Nakuru document”). In this document the mediators proposed what they regarded as fair 
compromises on outstanding issues (as ownership of subterranean natural resources), as 
well as some implicit trade offs inside different issues (as currency) (Stiansen 2004 
[interview]).  
When the Nakuru document was presented, the SPLA/M delegation was willing to 
negotiate, while the GOS delegation rejected the document. In a public speech, President 
Bashir declared that “IGAD could go to hell” as a reaction to the document (ICG 2003c: 
3). According to Justice Africa (2003: 1), the rejection by the GOS was mainly due to 
disagreement on the issues of the national capital, power sharing and security. The GOS 
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 had only minor comments on the issues of wealth sharing, in which indicates that the 
arrangements of the Nakuru document would have been acceptable for the GOS. 
The peace process seemed near a collapse and there was high activity by internationals to 
get the parties back to the negotiation table. In mid-August 2003 the parties met in 
Nanyuki (Kenya), but little was achieved in substance matters. There was thus a break of 
the IGAD talks (Stiansen 2004 [interview]).  
However, the mediators suggested a change of procedure. Instead of negotiating through 
the mediators, the parties agreed to direct consultations by two teams of people each and 
by the mediation of General Sumbeiywo (ICG 2003c: 4). The international observers and 
resource persons were to be present only to a limited degree during these consultations. 
In the beginning of September 2003, the new negotiation procedure was adapted and the 
leaders of the two parties, John Garang and Ali Osman Taha, met face to face in Naivasha 
(Kenya). This seemed to bring new dynamics into the negotiations. According to the ICG 
(2003c: 1), “the parties, and not the mediators, were leading the process by setting the 
agenda and driving the compromises”. On the 25th September 2003 a framework 
agreement on security arrangements were reached, which marked a major progress of the 
talks as a difficult issue had been broadly agreed on. 
In October 2003 a new round of talks began in Naivasha. Inspired by the arrangements of 
the Security agreement (two separate armies, but a certain number of common integrative 
units), the SPLA/M argued for a similar model to the issues of wealth sharing, like the 
establishment of two central banks and two currencies and a Joint Monetary Authority 
(Deng 2004 [interview]). The ICG (2003c: 7) claims that the SPLA/M demands of 
separate central banks and currencies “upset both the GOS and the World Bank and IMF 
experts involved in facilitating the process”. It seemed as a stalemate on the issue of The 
Three Areas had a spill over effect in hardening SPLA/M’s positions in the wealth sharing 
issues.  
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 After a Ramadan break in November, the parties met in December 2003. During this 
phase the international pressure was high, particularly from the United States.38 The 
parties talked of all outstanding issues, but it stood clear that there was a possibility to 
reach an agreement on wealth sharing as there were only a few outstanding issues in this 
field and compromises could be acceptable. It was also thought that an agreement on 
wealth sharing would make it easier to agree on other issues (Page 2004 [interview]).  
Throughout December 2003, Garang and Taha re-examined the issues of wealth sharing 
and reached an initial agreement on important issues as monetary policy, central bank, 
currency and land rights, and “grey zones” as representation in different commissions. 
Finally, disagreement stood on how to manage the oil sector during the interim period and 
how to share revenues (Mahgoub 2004 [interview]; Deng 2004 [interview]).  
On the 7th of January 2004 the parties signed the agreement on wealth sharing. The 
intricate issue of oil revenues was resolved and there seemed to be a momentum in the 
peace process.39 However, skeptics remarked that “the devil is hiding in the details” of the 
agreement. Several paragraphs are unclear and the implementation of the deal will face 
numerous challenges. Still, the agreement on wealth sharing covers many issues in detail 
and marked a major progress towards a final comprehensive agreement. 
Summing up this brief presentation of the course of the negotiations on wealth sharing 
can be done by reviewing the course of the negotiations through its various phases. The 
Machakos round with the signing of the Machakos protocol marked a first phase, which 
by solving the fundamental issues of self-determination and state and religion, gave a 
framework for detailed negotiations on the issues of wealth sharing. A second phase of 
                                              
38
 US Minister of foreign affairs, Colin Powell, visited Naivasha during the October round and set a deadline for a final 
agreement on the 31 December 2003 (Sudan Tribune 24 October 2003).   
39
 During the signing ceremony, John Garang told the reporters that “this is a major achievement that will take us closer to a just 
and lasting peace which we shall reach sooner than later, at least by the end of this month” (News article by IPS 10 Jan 2004).  
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 progress was marked by the consultancy of resource persons as they enabled the parties to 
reach a common understanding on how to address the issues and limit the area of 
disagreements. A third phase was marked by a proposal of a comprehensive agreement by 
the resource persons, which gave the parties a realistic text to bargain on. At this stage, 
but also during the process as a whole, international pressure made sure that the peace 
talks did not collapse at critical stages and set time limits for pushing for progress. Lastly, 
a phase of face to face negotiations at the top level enabled the parties to take decisions on 
how to finally settle the issues. In retrospect it seems as the proceedings of these phases 
were necessary for progress of the IGAD peace talks and the signing of the agreement on 
wealth sharing. 
4.2 The issues of wealth sharing and the specific positions of the parties 
In the following presentation of the issues of wealth sharing and the positions of the 
parties, I concentrate on the major issues. According to my investigations, ownership of 
land, management of the petroleum sector, existing oil contracts, sharing of revenues, 
monetary policy, central bank and currency were the major issues. In addition to these 
issues I also briefly look at how the control of flow of foreign funds was contested.  
Before looking at the issues, some comments on the principles of the agreement should be 
provided. The overall principle laid out for the negotiations on wealth sharing was an 
“equitable” sharing of common wealth. This is interesting as this principle is also the 
property in which the AW procedure is supposed to guarantee. According to the New 
Oxford Dictionary of English, “equitable” is an adjective for something which is fair and 
impartial. In Sudan, the principle of “equitable sharing of wealth” does at least date back 
to the Abuja talks of 1991 and 1992 between the GOS and the SPLA/M (Wondu and 
Lesch 2000). What was meant by the principle of “equitable sharing” in the negotiations 
on wealth sharing of the IGAD talks? 
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 In the agreement on wealth sharing the principle of an “equitable sharing of common 
wealth” is specified by a number of guiding principles. Several of these guiding principles 
recognizes the special needs of Southern Sudan, such as paragraph 1.7 stating that 
“Southern Sudan, and those areas in need of construction/reconstruction, should be 
brought up to the same average social/economic standard and public services as the 
Northern states.” Other paragraphs have clear similarities with the international covenants 
on human rights, as guiding principle 1.4 which states that “the sharing and allocation of 
wealth emanating from the resources of the Sudan shall ensure that the quality of life, 
dignity, and living conditions of all the citizens are promoted without discrimination on 
grounds of gender, race, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, language, or region” 
(Agreement on wealth sharing 2004: chapter 1).  
Most of the informants were asked whether the particular principle of “equitable sharing” 
had a specific impact in the talks. Generally, the informants claimed that this principle 
had no specific meaning and it therefore had no impact on what solutions where relevant 
for an agreement (Hødnebø 2004 [interview]; GOS informants 2004 [interview]; SPLA/M 
informants 2004 [interview]). One GOS informant meant that the principle of “equitable 
sharing” was used simply as a general principle of fairness which was more appropriate 
than the alternative principle of “equal” sharing, which would imply a strict sharing of 
resources according to population size or other criteria.  
Although the principle of “equitable sharing” seems to not have had any operational 
impact in the talks, this and the other principles outlined above were applied rhetorically 
by both parties to argue for a particular position (Stiansen 2004 [interview]). In that 
respect these principles probably had some resonance in the talks as they were introduced 
by the parties. However, the operational meaning of the principles was highly contested 
as both parties could use the principles for their interest based positions (as GOS 
delegation 2003b). Thus the actual impact of the principles on what solutions became 
salient may have been quite limited. Still, to what extent the principles had any significant 
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 impact on the course and outcome of the negotiations seems hard to answer in this 
investigation. 
4.2.1 Ownership and control of land 
Sudan is rich in resources, particularly in land, minerals and forests.40 Due to the 
commercial value of the resources (especially oil) and the grievances of how the 
resources have been handled by the state up to present day, ownership and control of land 
was a core issue in the negotiations of wealth sharing. The issue is complex and 
interlinked with several other issues of wealth sharing. The presentation below must 
therefore be regarded as an overview.  
When addressing ownership and control of land, the issue of oil had a great influence on 
how the parties developed their positions. The GOS argued that surface land and 
subsurface land (involving subterranean natural resources) are two different categories of 
“land”. The SPLA/M on its side, did not want to differ between two types of land in 
Sudan. The SPLA/M claimed that all land in Southern Sudan is owned by the 
communities (SPLA/M 2003a). The GOS rejected completely the claim of communal 
ownership in Southern Sudan. They agreed in principle to the SPLA/M’s demand of 
communal use rights of land in regard to surface land, but stood firmly on a position of 
national ownership of subterranean natural resources (Stiansen 2004 [interview]).  
From the mediator’s point of view, the positions of the parties regarding subsurface land 
seemed irreconcilable. From an early point of the negotiations (during the rounds in 
Machakos of November 2002) the mediators and the resource persons therefore proposed 
                                              
40 There is a great potential of agricultural production in Sudan due to vast areas of fertile soil along the rivers and in the South. 
Although some areas are ecologically sensitive and the access to water and the quality of the soil varies, both rainfed and irrigated 
agriculture has a great potential in Sudan, particularly in the war-affected areas where agriculture is to only a minor degree 
modernized (WB 2003: 1-2). Land resources do not only have a great commercial potential in Sudan, land represents the essential 
economic asset for many communities and tribes in Sudan. At the same time, many people are displaced due to the war, and in the 
event of peace many will return back to their land. This may potentially create conflicts over who has the right to different land 
areas. How the issue of land is resolved in a settlement and finally implemented thus have large implications for the durability of a 
peace agreement. 
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 that the ownership of subterranean natural resources could remain undecided in a peace 
agreement and that the parties eventually could agree to a process to resolve the 
ownership issue later. The resource persons argued that revenues could be shared 
although the issue of ownership remained undecided and that management of the oil 
sector could be resolved independently of how to share revenues from oil (Stiansen 2004 
[interview]).   
To let the ownership of subterranean natural resources remain undecided in the interim 
period became acceptable for the parties just a week before the agreement on wealth 
sharing was signed.41 However, more than a year before the signing of the agreement the 
mediators felt that this approach to the issue of ownership of subterranean natural 
resources was salient and would be the only acceptable outcome. The parties’ acceptance 
of letting the issue of ownership of oil remain unsettled did therefore not come as a 
surprise. Still, the way the issue was handled can be regarded as the major compromise of 
the agreement on wealth sharing as both parties had fundamental interests in the issue 
(Stiansen 2004 [interview]).  
In dealing with the issue of control of land and natural resources, an important juridical 
point of reference was the principle of “concurrent competencies of land”. This principle 
means that rights of land owned by the Government of Sudan are to be exercised at the 
appropriate or designated levels of government (Agreement on wealth sharing 2004: 
paragraph 2.3 and 2.4). The GOS argued that the central government should handle the 
use rights of subsurface land. Principally, the GOS claimed that the central government is 
best equipped to handle the natural resources of a country equitably and should therefore 
not only own but also decide over the use of Sudan’s natural resources (as oil, minerals 
and water). The rationale for this was that natural resources are unequally distributed 
                                              
41 How the ownership and revenues of subterranean natural resources is going to be settled in the event of secession after the 
interim period is not addressed in the agreement on wealth sharing. This is likely to be one of the most politicized issues during 
the interim period. Can the North accept that most oil fields will be owned by the GOSS if the result of the referendum is 
secession? 
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 around the country and the central government will be able to distribute revenues 
throughout the country according to different needs. In addition, the GOS claimed that the 
central government will have the oversight and capacity to decide how to develop the 
country’s natural resources in order to stimulate long-term economic growth and serve the 
country with resources (GOS delegation 2003b). When sharing oil revenues with a future 
regional Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), the oil should, according to the GOS, 
belong to the national government, but a percentage of the revenues could be distributed 
to the regional government (see chapter 4.2.5 on revenue sharing).  
Regarding surface land, the GOS was positive to some form of southern self-
determination in settling claims of communal use rights of land. However, the GOS 
argued that existing land laws in Sudan already protect customary rights to land and that 
laws do not have to be amended to meet the SPLA/M’s demand of communal use rights 
of land. The GOS also argued that if surface land is not registered as privately or 
communally owned, it belongs to the central state (GOS informants 2004 [interview]).42
The SPLA/M claimed that land, both surface and subsurface, is communally owned in 
Sudan. They argued that the state is supposed to be a guardian of communal ownership 
and basically the communities have the right to decide over land use. If commercial 
interests want to exploit the land, the state can in cooperation with the local community 
give a lease for operations on the land (SPLA/M informant 2004 [interview]). The 
SPLA/M claimed that customary land rights are not sufficiently protected in existing laws 
in Sudan. The SPLA/M wanted to introduce new land laws in Southern Sudan, based on 
                                              
42 This argument builds on the land policies of Nimeiri through the 1970s where mechanized agricultural schemes were 
developed to produce more cash crops for the international markets. The Unregistered Land Act of 1970 laid the fundament for 
Nimeiri’s policies by abolishing customary land use and entitled the central state to give commercial leases for land use.  In 1974 
the rights of lease holders were strengthened by the 1974 Law of Criminal Trespass as nomads and smallholding farmers’ access 
to land were restricted (Johnson 2003: 130). The NIF-government continued this policy of leasing land for commercial use 
through the 1990s, by acting as the arbiter in regard to oil development and by selling large leases for agricultural schemes in 
South Blue Nile (Johnson 2003: 135-6). The GOS position on surface land must probably also be understood as a strategic and 
Egypt-backed position. The water resources of the River Nile are of Egypt’s primary interests and Egypt has always supported a 
united solution in Sudan and central control of the land where the river flows.  
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 the legal tradition of the people of Southern Sudan (Stiansen 2004 [interview]). In 
Naivasha, the SPLA/M stated in their position paper that they wanted a process to 
develop and amend the land laws of Sudan to be in accordance with principles of 
communal land ownership (SPLA/M 2003a).43  
While a concretization on what the principle of “concurrent competencies” would mean in 
terms of subterranean natural resources was highly contested (see chapter 4.2.3), an 
approach of settling surface land claims through a National Land Commission and a 
Southern Sudan Land Commission gradually became acceptable for both parties. The 
Australian lawyer Patricia Lane played an active role in working out the paragraphs 
which set up land commissions. She demonstrated how communal land ownership can be 
established on the basis of common law and how land disputes can be settled through 
commissions of various stakeholders (SPLA/M informant 2004 [interview]; Stiansen 
2004 [interview]).44 Even though the ideas of the Australian lawyer were contested to 
begin with, her suggestions became acceptable to a wide extent (Stiansen 2004 
[interview]). The parties agreed to a process to develop and amend laws to incorporate 
customary laws and practices, local heritage and international trends and practices 
through a National Land Commission and a Southern Sudan Land Commission. Both 
commissions are going to give recommendations to the governments on land reform 
policies, recognition of customary land rights and appropriate land compensation. The 
commissions are to arbitrate between claims of land and to sort out such claims 
(Agreement on wealth sharing 2004: paragraph 2). 
                                              
43
 In a position paper the SPLA/M claims that “subterranean natural resources should be owned by land owners, but regulated by 
governments at their respective level” (SPLA/M 2003a). However, if there is a conflict over land use between the formal GOSS 
authority and the local communities in Southern Sudan, does the GOSS have sovereignty over the land and can overrule local 
communities, or do local communities have veto right in such a dispute? Does “ownership of the people” mean ownership of the 
GOSS, or does it mean that local communities are regarded as sole owners of the land? The SPLA/M position on land is unclear 
on this important point as the authority of the GOSS versus the local communities is not explicitly formulated. Still, how the issue 
of land is handled will probably be decisive for how many Sudanese will judge a forthcoming peace and how popular the 
SPLA/M will continue to be. 
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 In the Nakuru document it was suggested that there should be a National Land 
Commission with a branch in Southern Sudan (IGAD secretariat 2003a: chapter 12). 
However, in the agreement there was established an independent land commission in the 
South. The autonomy of the South in settling issues of surface land was thus extended 
throughout the negotiations. This is also demonstrated by a paper of initial agreement 
between the parties of October 2003 where the GOS accepted a separate Southern Sudan 
Land Commission to settle use rights of surface land (IGAD secretariat 2003b). In this 
paper the parties had agreed that the leadership of the Southern Sudan Land Commission 
was going to be appointed by the Presidency, involving some Northern control over the 
commission. However, the right to appoint the leader of the commission was changed in 
the agreement of January 2004 to being the powers of the President of the GOSS.  
The gradual agreement on a separate Southern Sudan land commission and finally 
agreement on a commission without any Northern control, indicates that control of 
surface land in the South was of fundamental importance for the SPLA/M, while the issue 
were of relatively less importance for the GOS. One reason why the GOS could accept an 
independent Southern Sudan land commission was probably that Southern autonomy in 
deciding over surface land followed to some extent logically from the Machakos 
protocol’s notions of self determination. Probably also the GOS realized the fundamental 
importance of the issue of land for the SPLA/M and that southern control of the surface 
land would be the only option for an agreement. In addition, the GOS had not sold 
licenses for use of surface land in the South and may not have the same commercial 
obligations to this land as to the agricultural areas of the South Blue Nile.  
At the same time, to what extent the Southern Sudan Land Commission will be sovereign 
in settling land claims of the South remains to be seen in practice. In dealing with claims 
of land a conflict may erupt between the Southern Sudan Land Commission and the 
                                                                                                                                                  
44
 The use of the Australian experience of dealing with claims of communal rights of land as an example for Sudan was justified 
by the fact that both countries have inherited the British legal tradition of common law (Lane 2003: 1).  
 68
 National Land Commission. If the commissions fail to reconcile their positions, the case 
is going to be decided by the constitutional court (Agreement on wealth sharing 2004: 
paragraph 2.9). Thus the Southern Sudan Land Commission’s independence may be 
limited by conflicts with the National Land Commission and decisions in the 
Constitutional Court.  
4.2.2 Compensation for displacement 
A part of the issue of land ownership was the question of rights to compensation for 
displacement. By March 2002 an estimated 174 200 civilians remained displaced as a 
result of fighting in the oilfields of Western Upper Nile / Unity State.45 This forced 
displacement was to a little extent discussed during the negotiations and the issue was 
addressed in principles (Stiansen 2004 [interview]). While the government accepted in 
principle displaced persons’ right to compensation, they wanted to control the process of 
giving people a right to compensation by channeling the question of compensation 
through the law system. 
The SPLA/M argued strongly for compensation for displacement in the oil regions. In the 
agreement on wealth sharing it is stated that persons whose rights have been violated by 
oil contracts are entitled to compensation. If a legal process shows that land rights have 
been violated, the parties of the oil contracts are given the responsibility for compensating 
the affected persons and the land commissions are authorized to assess appropriate 
compensation (Agreement on wealth sharing 2004: paragraph 4.5 and 2.7.7). The 
inclusion of these paragraphs was resisted by the government due to the many demands of 
compensation they may face. However, as the implementation of compensation will be 
dependent on how land claims are settled in the land commissions, the GOS can to some 
                                              
45
 This is an uncertain estimate, and do not include the many people who have fled to areas where the U.N. and other relief 
organizations do not have access, and those who have gone to Khartoum and other northern towns (HRW 2003: 39). 
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 extent control the eventual responsibility they will get in paying compensation for 
displacement.  
4.2.3 Management of the oil sector during the interim period 
Large areas of Southern Sudan have not been explored for oil due to the war. Concessions 
for exploration have been given in certain blocks, but in the event of exploitation there 
must be negotiated licenses for exploitation (Fawzi 2001: 249). Given the economic and 
political power of dealing with petroleum contracts, both parties had high interests in how 
leases and licenses were going to be settled in the interim period. In addition, several 
existing contracts are set to be renewed at certain dates and how these contracts are settled 
may have important implications. 
The GOS’ position on management of oil was to maintain central control of the petroleum 
sector during the interim period. The GOS wanted to establish a single and “national” 
commission and thereby secure its control of the important oil resources in the South. The 
rationale given for this position was parallel to the justification for federal ownership of 
natural resources. The GOS argued that management of natural resources would best be 
performed by a national body as it could make sure that resources are equalized in the 
interest of the people at large. By referring to what became guiding principle 1.4 of the 
agreement, “all parts of Sudan are entitled to development”, the GOS delegation claimed 
that the central government will be best equipped to apply the same formula for wealth 
sharing uniformly throughout Sudan and safeguard against regional imbalances and 
national instability. At the same time the central government must be equipped with 
revenues from natural resources to be able to foresee macroeconomic stability. The GOS 
also argued that central control of the oil revenues will be the best way to absorb the 
volatility of the oil price. If the states/regions were to control the oil revenues, they would 
be jeopardized due to instable revenues from oil (GOS delegation 2003b).  
In Naivasha the SPLA/M demanded three petroleum commissions; one “joint” or 
“national” petroleum commission, one Northern and one Southern oil commission 
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 (SPLA/M informant 2004 [interview]; GOS informant 2004 [interview]). They proposed 
that the national petroleum commission should be constituted of equal representation 
from the national government, the GOSS and representatives of oil producing 
states/regions. The national oil commission should be in-charge of oil contracts in the 
areas outside Southern Sudan, while the Southern commission should decide over 
contracts in Southern Sudan (SPLA/M 2003a; SPLA/M Sub-committee on wealth sharing 
2003d).  A separate oil commission in the South would give the GOSS autonomy in 
dealing with new oil contracts. 
In the agreement the parties ended up with a single petroleum commission: the National 
Petroleum Commission (NPC). The functions of the NPC are to formulate public policies 
and guidelines of the petroleum sector and to approve and supervise all oil contracts in 
Sudan. The NPC is going to consist of 5 members of the GOS and 5 members of the 
GOSS, in addition to a maximum of three non-permanent members from oil producing 
states/regions. One informant of the SPLA/M (2004 [interview]) claimed that they could 
accept one petroleum commission as the GOSS was given full control of the oil sector by 
having a de facto veto in the NPC. This is probably going to be the case as decisions are 
to be taken by consensus in the commission. This indicates that for the SPLA/M the 
importance of having control with the oil sector in the South was high, but that having a 
separate Southern oil commission was not a red-line position. For the GOS, the 
arrangement of the NPC which they agreed to indicates that establishing a national oil 
commission was of the greatest importance for the GOS and that they were willing to let 
the SPLA/M have a great influence in the NPC in order to establish one national 
commission.46
                                              
46 How could the GOS accept a NPC where the GOSS have de facto veto given the possibility that the GOSS may block all 
further leases in the South in order to get 100 percent of the revenues after secession? One reason can be that the GOS took it for 
granted that the GOSS will not block new concessions during the interim period due to internal political pressure for oil 
development and increasing revenues to the South. Another reason may be that the GOS is not dependent on the active work of 
the NPC during the interim period, as the GOS has signed the most important contracts for the interim period before a 
comprehensive peace agreement.   
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 4.2.4 The status of existing contracts 
Sudan has signed petroleum contracts with several oil companies since exploration started 
in 1974.47 These contracts have been negotiated by the GOS and the details of the 
contracts are confidential. The GOS stressed that existing contracts should not be re-
negotiated as these are sound contracts and a break of them will seriously damage the 
climate for future foreign direct investments in Sudan. Particularly due to the already high 
risk which companies face in Sudan given possible secession of the South, they argued 
that both parties should have a common interest in protecting the business climate in 
Sudan during the interim period (GOS informant 2004 [interview]).  
In September 2003 the position of the SPLA/M was to renegotiate contracts if they are 
“deemed to have fundamental social and environmental problems which can not be 
rectified by remedial measures” (SPLA/M 2003a). The SPLA/M argued that the oil 
contracts had been negotiated without southern consultation and participation and were 
illegal business contracts as the land is owned by the communities.  
In the agreement of January 2004, the SPLA/M accepted that existing contracts shall not 
be subject to renegotiation. SPLA/M’s concerns are addressed in a clause saying that if 
contracts are “deemed to have fundamental social and environmental problems the 
Government of the Sudan will implement the necessary remedial measures” (Agreement 
on wealth sharing 2004: Paragraph 4.3), though the SPLA/M gave up the wording of 
possible “re-negotiation”. This indicates that the importance of having the right to re-
negotiate oil contracts was not primary for the SPLA/M, while for the GOS this position 
                                              
47
 The most important concession holders in Sudan during the negotiations were China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), 
Petronas Nasional Berhad of Malaysia, ONGC Videsh Ltd. (Indian), TotalFinaElf, Lundin Oil AB (Swedish), OMV of Austria 
and Sudapet (Sudanese). In addition to these companies, Chevron Oil Co (US based) and the Canadian Arakis Energy Co (bought 
by Talisman Energy in 1998) have had a considerable impact on oil development in Sudan. Chevron was the major oil company 
in Sudan when oil exploration started in 1974, but pulled out of the South in 1984 when rebels killed three of its employees, and 
sold its assets in Sudan in 1992. Arakis Energy Co was an important partner in the development of the Greater Nile Petroleum 
Company (GNPC) in December 1996, and eventually the export of oil which started in August 1999 (HRW 2003: 2-4). However, 
Talisman received great international critics for its involvement in Sudan and was sewed for its actions in a New York lawsuit. In 
March 2003 it sold the final parts of its interests in the GNPC (Dow Jones International News March 2003; Talisman annual 
report 2003).   
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 was of great importance. The importance of this issue was possibly greater for the GOS 
than the SPLA/M as the GOS had negotiated the contracts and established a relationship 
with the oil companies (Stiansen 2004 [interview]). 
According to two SPLA/M informants (2004 [interview]), the SPLA/M accepted that oil 
contracts are not going to be renegotiated as there is an option to implement necessary 
remedial measures if contracts are found to have fundamental social and environmental 
problems (Agreement on wealth sharing 2004: Paragraph 4.3). The SPLA/M’s concerns 
are to some extent met with this option, and according to one central SPLA/M informant 
(2004 [interview]) the SPLA/M recognised the importance of the argument of not 
worsening the business climate in Sudan.  
4.2.5 Sharing of revenues 
Petroleum revenues are the major revenues in Sudan by constituting approximately 35 
percent of the federal government revenue in 2002 ($1 billion per year in 2002). A 
durable peace will create an opportunity for increased oil revenues, probably up to levels 
of $2 billion a year for at least a decade (CSIS 2002: 1). In addition to petroleum, major 
sources of federal government revenues in Sudan today are taxes on income and profits, 
taxes on domestic goods and services and taxes on international trade. Peace will provide 
an opportunity to increase these non-oil revenues, especially through international trade, 
investments and donation. There is also a potential for increased government revenues in 
Sudan by better state performance due to a currently low total revenue raising 
performance by the state (11.3 percent of GDP in 2001) (WB 2003: 49-50).  
In discussing non-oil revenues, the parties worked on a framework of specific distribution 
of revenue sources and taxes between levels of government. In Karen, the parties outlined 
how a wide range of non-oil revenues could be entitled to either the national level, the 
GOSS or the states/regions and reached an initial agreement on this (SPLA/M informant 
2004 [interview]). However, during the negotiations there was considerable disagreement 
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 on what type of revenue sharing model should be applied and the formulas for distribution 
of both oil and non-oil revenues.  
In Naivasha, the GOS argued for collecting revenues from oil as a national resource and 
distribute a share of the total government revenues to the GOSS as equalization (GOS 
informants 2004 [interview]). Regarding an eventual formula for sharing the oil revenues 
specifically, the government argued that it had already invested in the development of the 
oil fields and attracted international partners and that this should be taken into account 
when revenues were going to be shared (ICG 2003b: 14).  
The SPLA/M claimed that since most of the oil is in the South (as of the borders of 1st 
January 1956) and it had been exploited by the cost of many southern lives, the South 
deserves the lion’s share of the oil revenues (ICG 2003b: 14). Referring to amongst others 
the “Khartoum Peace Agreement” of 1997 where Riek Machars’ group was promised a 
high share of the oil revenues, the SPLA/M claimed 90 percent of the revenues from the 
oil in the South to begin with (SPLA/M informant 2004 [interview]).48 In Naivasha in 
October 2003, the SPLA/M adjusted its demands and proposed that 5 percent of the oil 
revenues should be allocated to the oil producing state/region, 60 percent of the revenue 
of oil produced in Southern Sudan should be transferred to the GOSS and the remaining 
balance should accrue to the National Government. Regarding other federal revenues, 
pooled in a “National Revenue Fund”, the SPLA/M proposed that 10 percent of the 
nationally collected revenue should be allocated annually to the GOSS and its 
states/regions for “general budgetary expenditure and establishment of institutions of 
governance”, and 33.4 percent of the remaining balance should be allocated annually to 
the GOSS for costs of “repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration, 
reconstruction and development” (SPLA/M 2003a). However, this proposition must be 
                                              
48
 Rick Machar, the leader of the SPLA fraction “SSIM/A”, signed a peace agreement with the government in April 1997.  A part 
of the deal was a referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan and a great share of the oil revenues to Southern Sudan 
(Johnson 2003: 122-123, 209).   
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 regarded as a quite maximalistic position as several of these percentages were 
significantly reduced in the agreement. 
During the talks on revenue sharing, an important aspect became the limited ability of the 
GOS to share revenues the first years of the interim period. The central government is 
highly indebted and has great financial problems (World Bank 2003). If the central 
government should be able to carry out basic government tasks after a peace deal, it can 
not afford to share a high percentage of oil or other revenues, at least not in the beginning 
of the interim period (GOS informant 2004 [interview]; Stiansen 2004 [interview]). Thus, 
when the resource persons suggested a revenue sharing model, they did not base the 
model on specifications of the enormous needs for reconstruction and development in the 
South, but based the suggested model on the central government’s assumed ability to 
share revenues within a strict budget. However, the resource persons stressed that the 
GOS through increased taxes, enhanced tax collection, donations from abroad, decreased 
military expenses and oil investments throughout the interim period would be able to 
share a significant part of today’s federal revenues with the GOSS. The resource persons 
therefore proposed a revenue sharing model where federal revenues allocated to the 
GOSS were to be increased throughout the interim period (Stiansen 2004 [interview]).  
The specific arrangements of such a revenue sharing model were suggested in the Nakuru 
document. In the Nakuru document it was proposed that transfers and revenues to the 
GOSS should come in mainly fours ways. The first and main revenues of the GOSS were 
to be transfers from the federal government in the form of equalization and allocation of 
revenues collected nationally (pooled in a “National Revenue Fund”) (IGAD secretariat 
2003a: chapter 18). These transfers would involve revenues from existing oil contracts as 
well as other national revenues (taxes and duties). To let the GOSS be entitled to revenues 
based on a certain percentage of GDP instead of simply a percentage of oil revenues from 
all oil contracts, was intended to establish a predictable and stable flow of revenues to the 
GOSS as well as creating an arrangement for equalization in a federal system (Stiansen 
2004 [interview]). The percentage of GDP defining the federal transfers to the GOSS was 
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 to be increased throughout the interim period as well as GDP was expected to rise. A 
second important source of revenues for the GOSS would be donations from abroad. 
Along with the proposals of the parties, a “Southern Sudan Reconstruction Fund” was 
suggested in the Nakuru document to handle these revenues (IGAD secretariat 2003a: 
chapter 27). Thirdly, the GOSS was to be entitled to raise and collect different taxes and 
charges as state personal income tax and agricultural tax (IGAD secretariat 2003a: chapter 
17). Finally, a source of revenues for the GOSS was to be oil revenues from “new” oil 
contracts. The resource persons thereby proposed that revenues from “new” (contracts 
signed after the start of the interim period) and “old” (existing) oil contracts should be 
treated differently. It was suggested that the GOSS should be entitled to 48 percent of the 
revenues from “new” oil contracts (IGAD secretariat 2003a: chapter 16).49 The federal 
government was to collect the revenues from “old” contracts, but parts of the revenues 
from these contracts would be indirectly shared with the GOSS through transfers defined 
as a certain share of GDP.  
Interestingly, the parties did neither agree to share oil revenues nor to establish transfers 
from the federal government like as was suggested in the Nakuru document by the 
resource persons. Regarding oil, the parties agreed to not differentiate between “new” and 
“old” contracts, but instead to share revenues from oil produced in Southern Sudan by 
allocating two percent of the net revenue from oil to the oil producing states/regions and 
then share the rest of the oil revenues 50-50 between the national government and the 
GOSS. Instead of establishing transfers from the national government to the GOSS as a 
certain percentage of GDP, the parties agreed to a 50-50 percent sharing of national 
revenues (different taxes and non-oil-revenues) collected in the South (Agreement on 
wealth sharing 2004: paragraph 5, 6 and 7). These arrangements of revenue sharing mean 
                                              
49
 More specifically the GOSS was to receive 48 percent of a defined “net revenue from oil” after an amount of revenues had 
been transferred to an oil revenue stabilization account and the oil producing states/regions had got a share of the oil revenues. 
The oil producing states/regions were by the Nakuru document entitled to two percent of the net revenues of oil (including both 
“new” and “old” contracts), in proportion to output produced in each state (IGAD secretariat 2003a: chapter 16).   
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 that the revenues of the GOSS primarily will come from oil and that resources with an 
origin in the North will not be transferred to the South. What does this indicate on the 
position of the parties towards arrangements of revenue sharing? 
For the SPLA/M it seems to have been of greater importance to get a high percentage of 
oil revenues than to entitle the GOSS to a high level of transfers from the federal 
government. This apparent SPLA/M position is indicated by the paragraphs of the 
agreement where the revenues of the GOSS primarily come from oil in the South. Also 
informants (GOS informants 2004 [interview], international observers 2004 [interview]) 
felt that getting a high percentage of oil became of overall importance for the SPLA/M 
during the negotiations. These informants suggest that the SPLA/M adopted this position 
due to the symbolic aspect of the oil for Southern constituencies. Another motive for this 
position was a lack of trust in federal transfers due to the experience of the Regional 
Government after the Addis Abeba agreement in 1972. A representative from the 
SPLA/M claimed that “empirical evidence” shows that the South can not count on getting 
revenues from the North. In addition, separatist motives could have been important for the 
SPLA/M stressing oil revenues instead of transfers. In a political discourse on secession 
or unity during the interim period, secessionists can claim that the Northern government 
showed little will to share national resources and there is therefore no economic reason to 
cooperate with the Northern government.    
One starting point for discussing the GOS position on revenue sharing is to look at the 
final proceedings of the negotiations before the agreement on wealth sharing was signed. 
Two weeks before the signing of the deal, the GOS suggested that the arrangements of the 
Nakuru document of transfers could be applied as a basis for revenue sharing (GOS 
informants 2004 [interview]; Abango 2004 [interview]). The SPLA/M then rejected the 
arrangements of the Nakuru document. The SPLA/M instead insisted on the better part of 
the oil revenues. One of the final positions of the SPLA/M was that all the oil revenues of 
Sudan should be shared 50 – 50 and a certain percentage of nationally collected non-oil 
revenues should be entitled to the GOSS. However, to entitle the GOSS to a significant 
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 level of revenues from the North was not acceptable for the GOS, when the SPLA/M 
claimed 50 percent of the oil revenues. If the government were going to allocate a 
significant level of non-oil revenues in addition to 50 percent of oil revenues to the 
GOSS, the government would probably face a serious fiscal crisis with risky political 
consequences. On the other hand, if not a significant level of revenues collected by the 
federal government are allocated to the South, this is likely to lead to dissatisfaction in the 
South and involve political costs for the GOS. A low level of transfers from the federal 
government to the GOSS is likely to lead to less integration between the federal level and 
the GOSS during the interim period compare to what extensive transfers might lead to. 
Also, small federal transfers give secessionists an argument in saying that the GOS was 
not willing to share revenues with the South. Did the GOS consider the political costs of 
not sharing revenues that is collected in the North with the GOSS?   
The GOS sees the oil in the South as a national resource. From that point of view, the 
GOS can claim that a significant part of the national revenues have been shared with the 
South (Stiansen 2004 [interview]). However, in the agreement there are few revenues that 
clearly come from the North (Agreement on wealth sharing 2004). It therefore seems as 
the GOS did not consider the political costs of not committing to explicit transfers from 
the federal government to the GOSS based on revenues collected in the North as 
important. Instead it seems as the primary position of the GOS was to safeguard the 
revenues of the central government even if it meant political costs of not explicitly 
sharing revenues from the North with the GOSS. 
Finally it should be mentioned that the expenditures of the national government may have 
been an important factor for the parties in arriving on a revenue sharing model where non-
oil revenues collected in the North is not shared with the South (Hødnebø 2004 
[interview]). The national government will be responsible for various costs (like the 
diplomatic service, the central civil service and the integrated military units) and the 
parties may possibly have reached an understanding that the national government will be 
responsible for certain expenditures of the South, for instance pensions of SPLA/M 
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 soldiers. However, whether this will be the case or not will eventually be sorted out in a 
comprehensive peace agreement.   
4.2.6 Monetary policy, central bank and currency  
In the government controlled areas of Sudan, Islamic banking laws have been applied 
since 1983 (Stiansen 2004 [interview]). In principle interest rates are prohibited, but 
borrowing and lending take place through other instruments. In the SPLA/M controlled 
areas of Sudan there have been no formal financial institutions during the war. Numerous 
currencies are circulating in the South and barter is common (World Bank 2003: 56-7).  
The GOS legitimized its coup d’etat in 1989 as an Islamist revolution and maintaining the 
Islamic banking system in the North seemed to be of the greatest importance for the GOS 
during the negotiations. To meet the SPLA/M demands of conventional banking laws, the 
GOS suggested a southern branch of the central bank to facilitate both conventional and 
Islamic banking in the South. However, the GOS proposed a continued strong role by the 
Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) in regulating a single monetary policy of Sudan (GOS 
delegation 2003c).  
Given the secularist ideology of the SPLA/M, it was a major concern to have 
conventional banking system in the South and not Islamic banking laws. In addition, the 
SPLA/M was not willing to accept the Dinar as a currency in the South, as it is associated 
with Islamization and Arabization (Stiansen 2004 [interview]).  
In the first round of talks in Naivasha the SPLA/M proposed a Joint Monetary Authority 
to formulate and oversee the implementation of monetary policy during the interim 
period. As the government, the SPLA/M also proposed the establishment of a Bank of 
Southern Sudan (BOSS) as a branch of the CBOS, but differed from the GOS proposal in 
setting up the head of the BOSS as the Deputy Governor of the CBOS. The SPLA/M 
accepted a new common currency, but wanted an explicit formulation that the New Sudan 
Pound would be regarded as a legal tender in the whole of Sudan until a new currency is 
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 issued. Already in December 2002, the SPLA/M announced the intention to issue New 
Sudanese Pounds in areas under its control (ICG 2002c: 19).50  
Following the breakthrough of the security agreement in September 2003, the SPLA/M 
wanted to apply a more confederal model in the area of banking (SPLA/M informant 
2004 [interview]). The SPLA/M thereby developed their position from accepting the 
BOSS as a branch of the CBOS to claiming de facto two central banks, two currencies 
and a small coordinating unit at the central level. The SPLA/M thus adopted a confederal 
position on banking and currency which was further from the GOS position than the 
initial SPLA/M position. To what extent this was a tactical move in order to trade this 
issue for a greater concession from the GOS on another issue, or whether this reflected a 
genuine change of priorities of the SPLA/M, is unclear. However, in the agreement the 
SPLA/M accepted the BOSS as a branch of the CBOS and gave up its demand of de facto 
two central banks. This indicates that the position of de facto two central banks was not of 
the greatest importance for the SPLA/M. Also, the SPLA/M had a hard task in arguing for 
two central banks, as it would contradict what is an international trend of fewer central 
banks and currencies. In addition, a joint monetary policy would be difficult to carry out 
with two central banks. The position of two central banks and currencies was also 
problematic in relation to the goals of unity of the Machakos protocol, as one common 
currency is an important integrative factor of societies.   
In the agreement the parties arrived at maintaining the Islamic banking system in the 
Northern Sudan, while establishing a conventional banking system in Southern Sudan. A 
restructured CBOS is to be responsible for a single monetary policy in the whole of Sudan 
and is supposed to be independent in the pursuit of this function. The head of BOSS is to 
                                              
50
 The SPLA/M claims to have newly printed New Sudan Pounds stored in Uganda. Given that this money exist, those who have 
paid for the printing of the money are probably highly concerned about the future value of them. Two informants claimed that 
private motifs of guaranteeing the value of these money pushed the SPLA/M position of including a paragraph which could 
guarantee the possibility to exchange the New Sudanese Pound with the new common currency (international observer 2004 
[interview]; GOS informant 2004 [interview]). 
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 be a deputy governor of CBOS, along with another deputy governor responsible for the 
Islamic banking of the North (Agreement on wealth sharing 2004: chapter 14).  
4.2.7 Reconstruction and development funds 
Large areas of Sudan, particularly in the South, are undeveloped in terms of modern 
infrastructure, education and health services. In the event of peace, Sudan can expect aid 
from foreign countries and these donations may constitute an important part of the 
country’s revenues. The parties agreed to establish a Southern Sudan Reconstruction and 
Development Fund (SSRDF) and a National Reconstruction and Development Fund 
(NRDF) to handle donations from abroad. There was little disagreement regarding the 
management of the funds, but there was controversy on how foreign funds are going to 
flow into the SSRDF. While the GOS wanted to control the flow of foreign funds through 
special accounts in the CBOS (GOS delegation 2003c), the SPLA/M demanded that 
foreign funds should be channeled directly to the BOSS and thus be fully controlled by 
the GOSS (SPLA/M 2003a).  
In the agreement on wealth sharing it is stated that “funds may be channeled directly to 
finance activities beneficial to the National Government or the GOSS as the case may be” 
(Agreement on wealth sharing 2004: paragraph 15.10). It is also stated that in the interim 
period the foreign funds for the Southern Fund “will be disbursed through a special 
account at the Bank of Southern Sudan designated for the Government of Southern 
Sudan” (Agreement on wealth sharing 2004: paragraph 15.11). These paragraphs seem to 
propose arrangements for a direct transfer of money to the SSRDF and thus meet the 
SPLA/M’s demands of full control of the flow of foreign funds to the South. However, 
when real life arrangements for handling flow of foreign funds are going to be established 
there might be different interpretations of these paragraphs that may give a significant 
control to the CBOS in dealing with the flow of foreign funds. 
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 4.2.8 Other issues 
In addition to the above discussed issues, there are some other issues or topics covered by 
the agreement on wealth sharing. The discussion on equalization led to the establishment 
of a Fiscal and Financial Allocation Commission. This commission is to monitor and 
ensure that “equalization grants from the National Revenue Fund are promptly transferred 
to respective levels of government” (Agreement on wealth sharing 2004: paragraph 
8.2.1). Although one GOS informant (2004 [interview]) mentioned that there was some 
disagreement on the representatives of the commission, it seems as there was no 
disagreement on establishing the commission.  
The agreement on wealth sharing also deals with how to finance the transition, accounting 
standards, division of government assets, interstate commerce and government liabilities. 
According to my investigations, these paragraphs were discussed only to a small degree. 
That does not necessarily indicate that these paragraphs do not represent issues of great 
importance. Rather it may be the case that little discussion was devoted to these 
paragraphs as their areas of disagreement were postponed for later occasions to address 
the issues. In this investigation into the issues of wealth sharing I do not go further into 
these paragraphs. 
4.2.9 What were the general positions of the parties to the issues of wealth sharing? 
In this chapter I have presented what were the major issues of the negotiations on wealth 
sharing in the IGAD talks. Ownership of land, sharing of revenues, the status of existing 
oil contracts, management of the petroleum sector, monetary policy, central bank, 
currency and flow of foreign funds were important issues. In table 4.1 below these issues 
and the assumed positions of the parties are presented.  
In general the GOS were in favor of nationally based solutions, like one central bank, 
currency and petroleum commission. It can be argued that such arrangements will foster 
integration of the country and contribute to fulfilling the goal of unity of the Machakos 
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 protocol. However, it seems as the general position of nationally based solutions not 
necessarily represented a will of the GOS to make unity attractive. While the final 
composition of the NPC shows a will of GOS to share power with the GOSS, the fact that 
no revenues collected in the North are allocated to the GOSS, will probably not contribute 
to make unity attractive.  
A general trait of the SPLA/M positions seems to have been to maximize autonomy by 
establishing separate Northern and Southern institutions. Although the arrangements of 
the agreement in which the SPLA/M accepted is not particularly confederal, the SPLA/M 
argued for two petroleum commissions, two de facto central banks and two currencies. 
Also, the fact that the SPLA/M seemed to be in favor of a Southern revenue base instead 
of creating a more integrative system of revenue allocation, supports the impression that 
the SPLA/M did not want to establish federally based institutions. The SPLA/M argued 
for confederal solutions and one explanation may be that these solutions reflected a 
general position of maximizing autonomy and eventually making separation more likely. 
However, there are two other possible important concerns which may explain why the 
SPLA/M argued for separate and confederal arrangements.  
Firstly, it can be argued that the SPLA/M argued for separatist solutions out of tactical 
reasons. In order to bargain hard and launch maximalistic positions, the SPLA/M had to 
move an essentially integrative position in a separatist direction. This explanation may 
have some bearing on why the SPLA/M delegation could end up on certain “integrative” 
positions (as for central bank and currency), but do not seem to be sufficient for a general 
explanation for the SPLA/M positions. The reasons for this, is that the SPLA/M could 
have moved their maximalistic positions towards gaining greater control and revenues out 
of integrative solutions, instead of arguing for confederal or separatist solutions. It thus 
seems as the tactical weight of a separatist position may explain some of the internal 
dynamics leading up to the SPLA/M positions, but that it is not a sufficient explanation as 
being the driving force of the SPLA/M positions.  
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 Secondly, the SPLA/M general position of confederal or separatist solutions may not 
necessarily reflect a separatist position, but rather a fear of biased implementation of the 
agreement in the creation of integrative institutions. As one SPLA/M informant (2004 
(interview]) said, “there is empirical evidence that the North will not keep what they 
promise”. The SPLA/M may have adopted a bargaining position of confederal or 
separatist solutions in order to guarantee their gains in the agreement and eventually be 
open for establishing more integrative solutions after having gained more confidence in 
cooperation with the central level.  Given the history of poor implementation of peace 
agreements in Sudan, this concern is well grounded. In conclusion, I suggest that the 
position of having unity as a final aim, but realizing the risks associated with integrative 
institutions, was held by some SPLA/M representatives, while others were more inclined 
to prepare for secession and argue for confederal solutions. However, in spite of different 
aims, these two groups could unite in their fear for Northern domination through the 
interim period and unite for confederal positions during the negotiations.    
Table 4.1: The main issues of the talks in Naivasha (September 2003 to January 
2004) and the assumed positions of each party 
Issue GOS position SPLA/M position 
Ownership of 
land 
Differ between surface and 
subsurface land 
Use rights of surface land can be 
held by communities 
Subsurface natural resources 
belong to the national government 
South Sudan land commission 
acceptable, but chairman appointed 
by the Presidency of the GOS 
Land is communally owned 
Subterranean natural resources are 
owned by land owners and regulated 
by governments at their respective 
level 
Fully autonomous Southern Sudan 
land commission 
Management of 
the oil sector 
during the 
interim period 
National oil commission 
Decisions by majority 
Limited GOSS representation in 
the NPC 
 
Three and later two oil commissions 
Decisions by consensus 
GOSS half of the representatives in  
the NPC 
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 Table 4.1 continued. 
Issue GOS position SPLA/M position 
Existing 
contracts 
No changes 
Every contract before 
comprehensive peace agreement is 
valid 
Re-negotiate if deemed to have 
fundamental social and 
environmental problems which can 
not be rectified by remedial 
measures. Contracts signed after 
agreement on wealth sharing invalid 
Revenue sharing 
in the interim 
period 
Oil revenues collected as a national 
resource 
Limit the transfers to the GOSS 
and the states/regions 
Differ between oil revenues and non-
oil revenues 
A high percentage of oil revenues to 
the South and the oil producing 
states/regions 
A high level of federal transfers to 
the South and the states/regions 
Direct oil revenues matter, federal 
transfers less reliable 
Monetary 
policy, central 
bank and 
currency 
One currency and one central bank  
Sharia based banking laws 
Southern “window” of 
conventional banking 
Central control of Southern 
borrowing 
Bank of Southern Sudan as branch of 
Central Bank of Sudan. 
Conventional banking in the South 
Establish a Joint Monetary Authority 
Dinar and New Sudanese Pound as 
legal tenders until new common 
currency  
October 2003: Two currencies and 
de facto two central banks  
Flow of foreign 
funds 
All foreign funds channeled 
through the CBOS 
Foreign funds to the South channeled 
directly to the BOSS 
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 5 A hypothetical application of the AW procedure 
In chapter 4 I discussed the main issues of wealth sharing that were addressed in the talks 
leading up to the agreement of January 7th 2004. Below I investigate how these issues can 
be dealt with by the AW procedure. I start by discussing which issues can be included in 
the procedure and which may not be included. Then I go on with a chosen set of issues to 
make assumptions on the quantified utility which each party could attach to the different 
issues. To arrive at ratings of the issues, I apply the three staged procedure presented in 
chapter 2. First, the basis of utility for the issues is suggested. Secondly, assumptions on 
what winning and sharing can imply on each issue are presented. Thirdly, additive scales 
of the issues summing up to 100 points are worked out. Based on the discussion on the 
importance of the issues for the parties in chapter 4 and interviews with informants, I 
suggest an ordinal ranking of the issues for the parties. These ordinal rankings are simply 
transformed to cardinal utilities by the formula presented in chapter 2.3 to get ratings of 
the issues adding up to 100 points. Having worked out a hypothetical point allocation of 
the utility value of winning on each issue, the AW procedure is finally carried out and an 
arguably fair settlement suggested.  
5.1 Which issues can be included in the AW procedure? 
Which issues can be included in the AW procedure are both dependent on what issues the 
parties can accept as issues and on whether these issues fruitfully can be handled by the 
AW procedure without violating the assumptions of additivity and linearity. Regarding 
the acceptance of the issues, I assume in this hypothetical application of the AW 
procedure that the parties can accept the set of issues in which were regarded as the major 
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 issues in chapter 4.51 Regarding the assumptions of additivity and linearity, I investigate 
below whether these assumptions pose any significant problems for that set of issues. 
The issue of ownership of subterranean natural resources was highly contested. Finally 
the issue was left unresolved. Including this issue in the AW procedure is technically 
possible, but the inclusion of such a sensitive issue would probably not be acceptable for 
the parties. They seemed completely unwilling to accept any trading or compromise on 
the issue, except leaving it undecided (Stiansen 2004 [interview]).  
If the issue of ownership of subterranean natural resources is going to be included, it has 
to be clear that ownership of the resources does not mean a specific entitlement to the 
revenues to successfully separate these issues. However, the management of the 
petroleum sector is potentially problematic to separate from the ownership of the 
subterranean natural resources. If the ownership of subterranean natural resources is 
entitled to a specific government level, it would logically (but not necessarily) follow that 
this level should be the one to decide over the management of the resource.  
Given these two problematic aspects of including the issue of ownership of subterranean 
natural resources, I suggest that an application of the AW procedure to the issues of 
wealth sharing should exclude the issue of ownership of subterranean natural resources. 
Since it can be argued that in real-life the issue of ownership of oil can be left unsettled 
(Lane 2003), I suggest that the AW procedure can be fruitfully carried out although the 
issue of ownership of subterranean natural resources is excluded.  
It seems as ownership of surface land can be included in the set of issues by regarding the 
independence and status of the Southern Sudan Land Commission as an issue. The status 
of the Southern Sudan Land Commission is highly related to the issue of compensation 
                                              
51
 There are some strategic aspects that parties are likely to consider when they are going to sort out a set of issues to be handled 
by the AW procedure. These strategic considerations are elaborated on in chapter 6.5. 
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 for displacement. The aim of establishing a Southern land commission is in principle to 
sort out who may have rights of land and thereby be entitled to compensation if their 
rights have been violated. Compensation for displacement is therefore excluded as a 
single issue in the hypothetical application of the AW procedure as it is interlinked with 
the issue of the Southern Sudan Land Commission.   
Sharing of revenues also pose some problems in preparing the issue for the AW 
procedure. There are different sources of revenues and should the revenues from the 
different sources be treated as different issues, or lumped together as one package of a 
revenue model? Treating revenue sharing as one issue may not allow for trade-offs 
between the different revenue sources. In this hypothetical application of the AW 
procedure I therefore suggest that revenue sharing is split into three issues: Oil revenues 
to the states/regions, oil revenues to the GOSS and non-oil transfers from the national 
government to the GOSS.  
National government expenditures are not covered in the agreement on wealth sharing, 
but may have been an issue which may have influenced on the arrangements of the 
agreement. In this hypothetical application of the AW procedure I assume that the ratings 
of the issues can be done independently of other issues not included in the set of issues, 
both other issues of wealth sharing and other issues of the negotiations.  
It seems, as with the exclusion of the issues of ownership of land and compensation for 
displacement, the other main issues that were investigated in chapter 4 can be treated by 
the AW procedure without violating the assumption of additivity. As a set of issues for 
this hypothetical application of the AW procedure, I use the issues of the Southern Sudan 
Land Commission, oil revenues to the states/regions, oil revenues to the GOSS, 
management of the oil sector, existing oil contracts, monetary policy, central bank and 
currency, equalization and allocation of funds collected nationally and flow of foreign 
funds. The question is then whether these issues can meet the precondition of linearity 
when treated by the AW procedure.  
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 Whether the precondition of linearity is met is dependent on an eventual sharing of the 
different issues. The implications of sharing of the different issues are presented in table 
5.2. For issues which regard revenues I have suggested two alternative ways of sharing 
the issues. I suppose these options of sharing both have the potential to correspond to a 
linear satisfaction of utility value for the parties. For the other issues I suggest flexible 
sharing implications which I assume also have the potential to satisfy utility according to 
the percentage of the issues that a party is entitled to. For instance, I suggest that a sharing 
of the issue of central bank can be carried out by adjusting the representation in the Board 
of Directors.  
5.2 The basis of utility for each issue 
Investigating the basis of utility of each issue is a starting point for arriving at point 
allocated utility of the issues. In table 5.1 below, I suggest what can serve as sources of 
utility for the different issues of wealth sharing. The relative importance of these different 
sources of utility as well as their risk and discount factors are not discussed here as that 
would involve a high number of assumptions. Ideally all the factors making an issue of 
less or greater importance should be enlisted so it can be taken into consideration when 
prioritizing the issues.  
Table 5.1: Assumed basis of utility for the issues of wealth sharing 
Issue GOS utility SPLA/M utility 
Land 
commissions  
Control of the legal development of 
the fertile land in the South 
The economic value of potential 
agricultural development in the 
South 
Leases and taxes in relation to 
commercial activity of land use (as 
forestry and irrigated and rain-fed 
agriculture) 
Control the process of compensation 
for displacement  
Self-determination in land policy  
Political power in settling conflicts 
over land and developing land laws 
The economic value of potential 
agricultural development in the South  
Leases and taxes in relation to 
commercial activity of land use (as 
forestry and irrigated and rain-fed 
agriculture) 
Control the process of compensation 
for displacement 
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 Table 5.1 continued. 
Issue GOS utility SPLA/M utility 
Oil revenues An economic basis for securing the 
position of the regime 
Meeting the fiscal needs of the 
Sudan state 
An economic basis for a strong 
regional Southern Sudan 
Self-determination in land and natural 
resources 
Management 
of the oil 
sector during 
the interim 
period  
Control of the oil sector 
Upholding oil exploitation during the 
interim period 
 
Self-determination in land and natural 
resources 
Power to eventually delay oil 
exploitation during the interim period  
The status of 
existing 
contracts 
Upholding relations with the oil 
companies 
Securing the business climate in 
Sudan 
Moral victory in claiming contracts to 
be invalid; implies the regime has 
acted illegally 
Securing the business climate in 
Sudan 
Equalization 
and 
allocation of 
revenues 
collected 
nationally 
An economic basis for securing the 
position of the regime 
Meeting the fiscal needs of the 
Sudan state 
Creating integration between the 
national and the regional level, or 
making the regional level 
economically dependent on the 
national level 
 
An economic basis for an autonomous 
Southern Sudan 
Creating integration between national 
and regional level 
Monetary 
policy, 
central bank 
and currency 
Controlling the Sudanese economy 
Maintaining the Islamic banking 
system as proclaimed by the Islamic 
revolution 
Guaranteeing Islamic banking 
Limiting the possibility for Southern 
secession and ensuring geographical 
stability 
 
Greater Southern autonomy by having 
an independent currency 
Political delivery (anti-Islamic) by the 
creation of a conventional banking 
system in the South 
 
Flow of 
foreign funds 
Controlling the economic relations 
of the GOSS 
National sovereignty 
Autonomy in receiving foreign funds  
Guaranteeing funds reach the South  
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 5.3 Assumptions on what winning and sharing could imply for each party 
In table 5.2 I suggest what winning on an issue could imply for each party and what 
sharing could imply.52 The issues differ in terms of whether it is easy to suggest what 
winning can imply for a party and whether it is problematic to suggest how sharing of an 
issue can be carried out.  
For the issues of land commission, existing contracts and flow of foreign funds, 
determining what winning implies for each party seem relatively easy. It seems to exist 
roughly two alternative solutions for the issues and these two possible solutions can be 
used as what winning for each party would imply.  
For the issues of revenues and transfers involving different frameworks for revenue 
sharing it is more problematic to state what winning for each party should imply. Given 
that I have chosen to apply a set of issues where oil and non-oil revenues are separated, 
the framework for revenue sharing must be the same. This may be unacceptable for the 
parties and an alternative application of the procedure would be to lump together all the 
issues of revenue sharing. However, by applying the framework for revenue sharing as 
was agreed to in the settlement, I assume that the parties can accept this framework and 
that the percentages can be adjusted to be a reasonable “winning implication” for the 
parties.  
The framework for allocating oil revenues to the states/regions was not contested as the 
allocation of the other revenues. The two alternative percentages suggested as “winning 
implications” are thus based on position papers and seem unproblematic to prepare for the 
AW procedure.  
                                              
52
 Although these assumptions on winning are similar to the arrangements of the agreement, they should not be interpreted as 
meaning that either party necessary won or lost in what turned out to be the arrangements of the agreement. My suggestions of 
what winning and sharing could imply for each party are developed in retrospect of the signing of the agreement on wealth 
sharing. Whether the mediators during the negotiations would have suggested similar winning implications or not, can only be 
speculated on. My suggestions of winning implications are meant to illustrate how the issues can be treated by the procedure and 
investigate whether acceptable solutions can be worked out on the basis of the AW procedure. 
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 In dividing the issues of revenue sharing, I suggest that the ratio for a division can be 
applied to the range of revenues which exists between the parties’ positions. If for 
instance 70 percent of an issue of revenue sharing is going to be given to one party, then 
this party will get 70 percent of what are the revenues between the position of the GOS 
and the SPLA/M. One drawback of this sharing procedure is that it may create a sharing 
of for instance oil revenues in which is politically not sound. Why should one party 
receive 49.5 percent of oil revenues while another party 50.5 percent? Regarding how to 
share the issue of oil revenues to the GOSS, I have therefore suggested an alternative way 
of sharing the issue in which may be more politically feasible. 
Table 5.2: Suggestions of what winning and sharing could imply for each party 
Issue Winning for the GOS Winning for the 
SPLA/M 
Options for sharing of 
the issue 
Land 
commission 
in the South 
A national land 
commission with a 
branch in the South 
 
Fully independent 
Southern Sudan land 
commission 
Chairman of the 
commission appointed 
by the Presidency of the 
Sudan (instead of the 
President of the GOSS) 
Oil revenues 
to the 
states/regions  
1 percent for the 
states/regions of the “net 
revenue from oil” 
 
3 percent for the 
states/regions of net 
revenue from oil 
 
Adjusting the percentage 
in a range from 1-3 
percent of the “net 
revenue from oil” to the 
states/regions 
Oil revenues 
to the GOSS  
48 percent of the “net 
revenue from oil” to the 
GOSS 
 
 
52 percent of the “net 
revenue from oil” to the 
GOSS 
 
Adjusting the percentage 
of the “net revenue from 
oil” to the GOSS in a 
range from 48-52 
percent. 
Alternatively change the 
pool of revenues to be 
shared from all oil 
revenues to only 
revenues of Southern 
Sudan oil and share 
these 50-50. 
Management 
of the oil 
sector during 
the interim 
period 
National oil commission 
 
Southern oil commission 
 
Decision rules and 
representation in the 
national oil commission. 
Decision rules and 
representation in the 
Southern oil commission 
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 Table 5.2 continued. 
Issue Winning for the GOS Winning for the 
SPLA/M 
Options for sharing of 
the issue 
Existing 
contracts 
No changes. 
All existing contract is 
valid 
Re-negotiate if deemed 
to have fundamental 
social and environmental 
problems which can not 
be rectified by remedial 
measures 
Any contract after Karen 
should be invalid 
Adjusting the date of 
valid existing contracts, 
for instance to the 
signing of the agreement 
on wealth sharing 
Monetary 
policy, 
central bank 
and  currency 
One currency and one 
central bank  
Sharia based banking 
laws in the North, but a 
Southern “window” of 
conventional banking 
 
Establish a Joint 
Monetary Authority with 
equal GOS and GOSS 
representation 
Dinar and New Sudanese 
Pound as legal tenders 
until new common 
currency 
Bank of Southern Sudan 
as branch of Central 
Bank of Sudan. 
Conventional banking in 
the South. 
No explicit paragraph on 
the legality of the New 
Sudanese pound 
The representation in the 
Board of Directors  
Adjust the autonomy of 
the BOSS 
Equalization 
and 
allocation of 
funds 
collected 
nationally 
40 percent of federal 
revenues collected in 
Southern Sudan to the 
GOSS 
 
60 percent of federal 
revenues collected in 
Southern Sudan to the 
GOSS 
Adjusting the percentage 
in a range from 40-60 
percent 
Flow of 
foreign funds 
All flow of foreign 
funds controlled by the 
CBOS 
Foreign funds to the 
South flow directly to the 
BOSS 
Adjusting representation 
in a committee ruling 
the Southern 
reconstruction fund 
 
5.4 Point allocation 
Based on the investigations into the utility of the different issues and the development of 
the negotiations which ended in the final agreement, I suggest how the parties could have 
ranked the issues. The assumption of using the course of the negotiations and the 
agreement as a basis for suggesting a ranking of the issues, is that the priorities in which 
the parties seem to have made in holding on some positions, while giving away other 
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 positions, to a large degree reflects the preferences of the parties towards the issues (see 
chapter 2 for further elaboration on this). The rankings I suggest are not necessarily how 
the parties would have ranked the issues during the negotiations, but a ranking which can 
be used to investigate how an application of the AW procedure possibly would turn out if 
applied to the issues of wealth sharing in Sudan’s peace negotiations.  
Before specifically comparing the importance of the issues of wealth sharing, it should be 
mentioned that the parties seemed to base their priorities on two fundamental premises. 
For the GOS, one fundamental premise was that the existing state in Sudan is sovereign 
and another premise that the laws and arrangements in Sudan should remain status quo. 
For the SPLA/M, two other premises seemed to underlie their approach to the issues: The 
existing state in Sudan is not sovereign, and a quasi-state should be established in 
Southern Sudan. During the negotiations these premises represented a paradigm of 
thinking for the parties and they were highly reluctant of engaging in arrangements in 
which were not consistent with their paradigm (Stiansen 2004 [interview]). In suggesting 
below how the parties could have compared and ranked the importance of the issues of 
wealth sharing, I therefore build on these basic premises as well as the investigations into 
the positions and priorities of the parties carried out in chapter 4.2. 
For the GOS I suggest that management of the oil sector is ranked at top as the GOS 
strongly argued for one national petroleum commission and this became the arrangement 
of the agreement. One central GOS informant (2004 [interview]) stated that there was a 
trade off between oil revenues and management of the oil sector in the final round of the 
talks. Winning on oil revenues to the GOSS can therefore be ranked below winning on 
management of the oil sector for the GOS. However, although there was a trade-off 
between the positions towards these issues at the time, the importance of getting a good 
deal on the issues may have been of equal importance. Given the GOS dependence on the 
oil revenues, I suggest that oil revenues are ranked at top as well as management of the 
petroleum sector. I also suggest that winning on oil revenues to the GOSS is top ranked 
for the SPLA/M as they argued strongly for a certain arrangement on this issue during the 
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 negotiations and various types of informants had the impression that this issue was of core 
importance for the SPLA/M delegation.  
Concerning central bank and currency, I suggest this issue is ranked at top for the GOS as 
maintaining the Islamic banking system in the North seems to be perceived of greatest 
importance for the GOS for maintaining legitimacy among Muslim constituencies, 
ensuring stability of the banking sector and upholding sovereignty in Sudan (Stiansen 
2004 [interview]). Although existing contracts seem to be a greatly important issue for the 
GOS, this issue is ranked second, as the implications of losing on this issue is relatively 
less compare to the wide implications of losing on central bank and currency and 
management of the oil sector.  Further, winning on equalization and allocation of 
revenues collected nationally is regarded as less important for the GOS than winning on 
oil revenues, as oil revenues concerns significantly more money and transfers from the 
national level will create some GOSS dependence on the national level. Of second least 
importance for the GOS I propose control of the Southern Sudan Land Commission, as 
the GOS at an early phase of the talks agreed to let the GOSS have the control of this 
commission (the economic potential of the Southern land is high and the GOS could 
probably have ranked this issue higher, but I have chosen to primarily use the course of 
the talks as a basis for the GOS ranking on this issue). Finally, winning on flow of foreign 
funds is ranked second lowest for the GOS. The utility value of control of foreign funds is 
relatively low as the funds to the GOSS will have to flow directly to the GOSS given the 
demands of the GOSS and the international donors, though the importance of ensuring a 
national framework for money flow and maintaining sovereignty of the federal 
government, makes this issue of somewhat importance for the GOS. This brief 
elaboration on ranking of the issues, leads to a four-leveled ordinal ranking for the GOS 
and is presented in table 5.3 below. 
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 Table 5.3: A hypothetical ordinal ranking by the GOS 
Rank Issue 
1 Management of the oil sector during the interim period  
Oil revenues to the GOSS 
Monetary policy, central bank and currency 
2 The status of existing contracts 
3 Oil revenues to the states/regions 
Equalization and allocation of revenues collected nationally  
Flow of foreign funds 
4 Land commission in the South 
 
The issues of oil revenues, land commission in the South, management of the oil sector 
during the interim period and central bank and currency are probably of the highest 
importance for the SPLA/M and could possibly all have been ranked first. However, as oil 
revenues seemed to be the issue of the highest priority in the negotiations, I suggest a 
ranking were the issue of oil revenues to the GOSS is ranked at top and the issues of oil 
revenues to the states/regions, land commission in the South, management of the oil 
sector, and central bank and currency are ranked as second highest. Regarding 
equalization and allocation of revenues collected nationally, I suggest that winning on this 
issue is ranked lower than winning on oil revenues, as oil revenues were prioritized before 
non-oil revenues in the negotiations. I also suggest that winning on the issues of land 
commission, management of the oil sector and central bank and currency, is more 
important for the SPLA/M than non-oil transfers given the broader basis of utility of these 
issues. The issue of control of flow of foreign funds is important for the SPLA/M, but the 
basis of utility of winning on this issues is probably not as wide as the issues ranked first 
and second, as the GOSS will have the possibility to receive foreign funding although it 
eventually would lose some of the control on this money flow. The issue of existing 
contracts may seem to have been of high importance for the SPLA/M as they hold on to 
their position in this issue for a long time in the negotiations. However, due to the 
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 problematic aspects of renegotiation of business contracts for the SPLA/M during the 
interim period, this issue is ranked fourth. This leads to a four-leveled ordinal ranking of 
the SPLA/M which is presented in table 5.4 below. 
Table 5.4: A hypothetical ordinal ranking by the SPLA/M 
Rank Issue 
1 Oil revenues to the GOSS  
2 Land commission in the South 
Management of the oil sector during the interim period 
Monetary policy, central bank and currency 
Flow of foreign funds 
3 Equalization and allocation of revenues collected nationally 
Oil revenues to the states/regions  
4 The status of existing contracts 
 
The ordinal rankings of the issues can simply be transformed to cardinal utilities where 
each party has a total of 100 points.53 In table 5.5, the additative scales in which such a 
transformation leads to is presented as well as the utility points satisfied for the parties 
when the AW procedure is carried out. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
53
 See chapter 2.3 for the formula of how additative scales is calculated on the basis of the ordinal rankings.  
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 Table 5.5: Hypothetical point allocation of the issues 
Issue GOS 
utility 
SPLA/M 
utility 
Winner-
loser 
ratio 
Land commission in the South 5 14 3,14 
Oil revenues to the states/regions 9 10 1,05 
Oil revenues to the GOSS 18 19 1,05 
Management of the oil sector 18 14 1,27 
The status of existing contracts 14 5 2,86 
Equalization and allocation of revenues collected 
nationally 9 10 1,05 
Monetary policy, central bank and currency 18 14 1,27 
Flow of foreign funds 9 14 1,57 
Total points allocated 100 100  
Initial points satisfied 50 67  
Points satisfied after equalization adjustments 58 58  
 
5.5 Settlement suggested by the AW procedure 
Based on the rankings of table 5.5, the AW procedure proposes a solution where the GOS 
wins on the issues of management of the oil sector during the interim period, the status of 
existing contracts and central bank and currency. The SPLA/M wins on the issues of land 
commission in the South, oil revenues to the states/regions and the GOSS, equalization 
and allocation of revenues collected nationally and flow of foreign funds. This is shown 
in table 5.5 by the underlining of the utilities in which the parties initially win. Initially 
the GOS gets 50 points satisfied, while the SPLA/M gets 67 points. Three issues have the 
lowest winner-loser ratio: Oil revenues to the states/regions, oil revenues to the GOSS and 
equalization and allocation of revenues collected nationally. Which of these issues should 
be divided to carry out the equalization adjustment? Although this situation is special, it 
shows a potential problem of the equitability adjustment: Several issues may be equally 
relevant for sharing. Here, I suggest that the problem can be solved by choosing the issue 
of oil revenues to the GOSS as the issue to be divided. Both parties have ranked the 
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 highest number of utility points to that issue and it is therefore reasonable that the issue is 
chosen for the equalization adjustment.  
According to the equalization adjustment (18 + 14 + 18 + 18 (x) = 14 + 10 + 19 (1-x) + 
10 + 14, x = 0.46), 46 percent of the utility of winning on this issue should be given to the 
GOS, while the SPLA/M should remain 54 percent of its utility on winning on the issue. 
After the equalization adjustments, the parties have 58 points satisfied each. By judging 
the solution out of utility points satisfied for each party, the solution suggested seems to 
be equitable, envy-free and efficient according to the criteria of Brams and Taylor (1996).   
How can a settlement be created according to the division of the issues suggested by the 
hypothetical AW procedure above? If the assumptions of what winning and sharing could 
imply for each party (see table 5.2) are applied, the following settlement is suggested by 
the AW procedure:  
• As the SPLA/M wins on the issue of a land commission in Southern Sudan, a fully 
independent Southern Sudan Land Commission is created. 
• As the SPLA/M wins on the issue of oil revenues to the states/regions, there will 
be transferred 3 percent of the “net revenue from oil” to the states/regions. 
• The issue of oil revenues to the GOSS is going to be shared. One option is to share 
it so that the GOS receives 46 percent of the issue by allocating 48 + (4*0.46) = 
49.84 percent of the net revenue from oil to the GOSS. Another option is to change 
the basis of revenues which is going to be shared from the “net revenue from oil” 
to the “revenue from oil from Southern Sudan” and divide these revenues 50-50.  
• As the GOS wins on the issue of management of the oil sector, there is established 
one national petroleum commission. 
• As the GOS wins on the issue of the status of existing contracts, the existing 
contracts are not going to be re-negotiated. 
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 • As the SPLA/M wins on the issue of equalization and allocation of revenues 
collected nationally, 60 percent of the federal revenues collected in Southern 
Sudan will be transferred to the GOSS.  
• As the GOS wins on the issue of monetary policy, central bank and currency, there 
is going to be one central bank with a conventional window in the South through a 
Bank of Southern Sudan. There is going to be one currency for the whole country 
and the New Sudan Pound will not necessarily be regarded as a legal tender.  
• As the SPLA/M wins on the issue of flow of foreign funds, foreign funds to the 
South will flow directly to the BOSS. 
The settlement suggested by the AW procedure is not very different from the agreement 
on wealth sharing in which the parties of the IGAD talks agreed to (the only exception is 
the arrangement of transfers from the national government to the GOSS and the 
percentage of oil revenues to the states/regions). The AW produced settlement may thus 
have been acceptable as relatively fair given that the parties agreed to the real agreement 
because of some sense of having received a fair portion of claims.  
However, note that the settlement produced by the AW procedure is highly dependent on 
what is defined as winning on the issues for each party. In this hypothetical application of 
the AW procedure, I have used the proposals/position papers and the agreement of 
January 2004 to suggest what winning and sharing for each party can imply. In suggesting 
the ranking of the issues by the parties I have also used the same documents. The outcome 
of the procedure is thus logically not far from the agreement of January 2004. 
Given the set of issues, the rankings of the parties and the criteria of envy-freeness, 
equitability and efficiency for a fair division, it can be argued that the AW produced 
settlement is fair in terms of satisfying subjective utility value. However, it is hard to see 
how it can make sense that the hypothetical settlement is envy-free if that is 
operationalized as a settlement where “each of the parties thinks he or she got the largest 
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 or most valuable portion of something” (Brams and Taylor 1996: 241). Would the 
SPLA/M think that it received the largest or most valuable portion of the set of issues at 
stake in Naivasha if the AW procedure had been applied? It is hard to talk of a “portion” 
in these negotiations as the implications of winning on the different issues are different 
for the two parties. In settling oil revenues, each party receives a relatively clearly defined 
portion of a greater whole, but for the other issues, the portion of political power or self-
determination in which the parties receive is hard to compare. While the SPLA/M wanted 
as much autonomy and economic viability of Southern Sudan as possible, the GOS 
wanted to maximize central control. Is it possible to compare these two opposing 
demands or the portions of these claims that the parties receive? At a general level it may 
make sense for the SPLA/M to say that it received a good portion of the issue of 
autonomy and economic viability of Southern Sudan and would possibly not change this 
portion to an alternative and realistic portion of autonomy and economic arrangements. 
However, it is meaningless to discuss whether the SPLA/M would have changed its 
portion to the GOS’ portion: then the SPLA/M would be the government and that might 
have been highly tempting! Fairness in this hypothetical application of the AW procedure 
does therefore not seem to include envy-freeness as operationalized as a settlement where 
“each of the parties thinks he or she got the largest or most valuable portion of 
something” (Brams and Taylor 1996: 241).  However, the outcome of the AW procedure 
can still be regarded as fair defined by the steps of the procedure and how it divides 
satisfaction of subjective utility between the parties. Instead of comparing their real 
portion the parties received against the real portion the other party received, the parties 
have to closely look at what they gained out of their claims and compare this to what the 
other party gained out of their claims. Equitability does then seem to make sense as both 
parties through an equal satisfaction of utility points have received an equal portion of 
their claims satisfied, but a sense of envy-freeness seem hard to point to in this application 
of the AW procedure. 
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 I therefore suggest that whether the AW produced outcome presented above can be 
regarded as a procedurally fair settlement can not be deduced from the outcome above, 
but relies on at least two preconditions: 
- that the parties accept the initial suggestions of what winning on the different issues will 
imply for each party. 
- that the parties perceive a straight link between their point allocation of utility value and 
the real-life settlement created by the AW procedure. 
In addition, a crucial precondition for accepting the settlement as fair is that the parties 
can accept the specific entitlement to subjective utility points. One party may claim to 
have been historically neglected development and may therefore demand a greater share 
of utility value satisfied in a settlement to regard it as fair. Although this can be 
compensated for in the definitions of what winning will imply for each party, it can be 
explicitly worked out by letting one of the parties be entitled to a greater number of utility 
points. Below I investigate how this can be done on the same set of issues and the same 
distribution of points.  
5.6 Alternative applications of the AW procedure 
5.6.1 A settlement with unequal share of points 
Let us say that the SPLA/M is entitled to 5/8 of the total points of utility, while the GOS 
should have 3/8 of the total points of utility which can be shared. This means that the total 
number of points satisfied for the SPLA/M should be 1.67 times the number of points 
satisfied for the GOS.54
                                              
54
 Solving for X * 3/8 = 5/8 gives x = 1.67.  
 102
 If the SPLA/M wins on the issues of land commission in the South, oil revenues to the 
states/regions, oil revenues to the GOSS, management of the oil sector, equalization and 
allocation of revenues collected nationally and flow of foreign funds, the SPLA/M 
initially has 81 points (14 + 10 + 19 + 14 + 10 + 14), while the GOS has 32 (14 + 18) by 
winning on the status of existing contracts and monetary policy, central bank and 
currency. To satisfy the set share of 5/8 to the SPLA/M, 44 percent of the issue of oil 
revenues to the GOSS has to be allocated to the SPLA/M while 56 percent to the GOS.55 
The total points received by the GOS will then be 42 (32 + 18 * 0.56) and 70 (62 + 19 * 
0.44) for the SPLA/M.  
The solution suggested by the AW procedure giving unequal shares to the parties will in 
practice mean the following settlement (based on the assumptions of what winning and 
sharing will imply for each party presented in table 5.2): 
• As the SPLA/M wins on the issue of a land commission in Southern Sudan, a fully 
independent Southern Sudan Land Commission will be created. 
• As the SPLA/M wins on the issue of oil revenues to the states/regions, there will 
be transferred 3 percent of the “net revenue from oil” to the states/regions. 
• The issue of oil revenues to the GOSS is shared giving 56 percent of it to the GOS 
and 44 percent to the SPLA/M. Either the GOS receives 50.24 percent (48 + 4 * 
0.56) of the “net revenue from oil”, or the pool of the revenues is changed from the 
national “net revenue from oil” to revenue from oil of Southern Sudan which is 
divided 50-50. 
• As the SPLA/M wins on the issue of management of the oil sector there is 
established a Southern petroleum commission.  
                                              
55
 Solving for 1.67 (32 + 18x) = 62 + 19 (1 - x) gives x = 0.56. 
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 • As the GOS wins on the issue of the status of existing contracts, the existing 
contracts are not going to be re-negotiated. 
• As the SPLA/M wins on the issue of equalization and allocation of revenues 
collected nationally, 60 percent of the federal revenues collected in Southern 
Sudan will be transferred to the GOSS. 
• As the GOS wins on the issue of monetary policy, central bank and currency, there 
is going to be one central bank with a conventional window in the South through a 
Bank of Southern Sudan. There is going to be one currency for the whole country 
and the New Sudan Pound will not necessarily be regarded as a legal tender.  
• As the SPLA/M wins on the issue of flow of foreign funds, foreign funds to the 
South will flow directly to the BOSS. 
A settlement based on unequal shares is possible to carry out theoretically on the issues of 
wealth sharing in Sudan. However, as for the AW application with the equal entitlements 
the outcome of this application with unequal shares seems to be most dependent on what 
is defined as winning and sharing for each party. It therefore seems unfruitful to discuss 
any further to what extent this outcome is fair. In the discussion in chapter 6 I will turn 
back to the centrality of what is defined as winning and sharing when applying the AW 
procedure.   
5.6.2 Alternative goals of the parties giving alternative utility rankings 
Point allocation of the parties’ utilities towards the issues can be carried out by stating 
alternative goals in which the parties may maximize and then distribute the points 
according to these goals (see Denoon and Brams 1994). Below I suggest how the parties 
in the IGAD talks could maximize alternative goals during the negotiations. The 
alternative goals are presented in table 5.6. 
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 For the GOS, I suggest that it had the choice between two broad strategies. It could 
maximize a goal of making unity attractive by sharing powers to a great extent in the 
centre of Sudan and allocate a significant part of the national revenues to the GOSS. 
Solutions that in this way prioritise making unity attractive and which eventually are 
carried out with some success during the interim period do increase the chance for a pro-
unification result of the referendum after the interim period.  
Alternatively, the GOS could try to limit the sharing of wealth and power with the 
SPLA/M and other groups in order to keep as much as possible at central control, at least 
during the interim period. As democratization and sharing power with the SPLA/M is 
risky for the survival of the Congress Party (now constituting the GOS) and contradict 
ideological commitments to “the Islamic revolution” of 1989, the GOS may choose to 
maximize a goal of status quo and limiting the powers of both the SPLA/M and the 
GOSS, although the risks of Southern secession would increase by such a strategy. 
A baseline for the SPLA/M was to establish an autonomous Government of Southern 
Sudan and entitle it to sufficient resources for securing the South’s viability. Out of this 
baseline, I suggest that the SPLA/M either could maximize a creation of favorable federal 
institutions or they could maximize establishing confederal institutions. Most probably 
the second strategy would to a greatest extent foster secession (through independent 
institutions which will make secession easier and give secessionists a political argument 
in a debate for or against secession).  
Table 5.6: Alternative goals of the GOS and the SPLA/M 
Party Alternative goal 1 Alternative goal 2 
GOS Maximize central control Sharing of powers in a 
federal framework 
SPLA/M Maximize influence over federal institutions 
Maximize extent of 
confederalism 
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 Alternative goals will lead to different point allocations of the utility of winning on the 
different issues. However, alternative goals of the parties will also mean that they would 
go for different implications of winning and sharing on the different issues. For instance 
would the GOS be more concerned with getting winning implications of revenue sharing 
prioritizing equalization if they would maximize making unity attractive, while they 
would prioritize limiting the resources of the South in general if they would maximize a 
goal of limiting the powers of the SPLA/M and the GOSS. In order to carry out a 
modeling of alternative goals of the parties, new sets of winning and sharing implications 
have to be worked out and new allocations of points suggested. As also the perceived 
fairness of such a model of the AW procedure to a large extent would be dependent on 
what is defined as winning and sharing on each issue, I do not carry out a model of the 
AW procedure with alternative goals of the parties. It seems as the central task of defining 
what winning should imply on each issue is illustrated by this alternative application of 
the AW procedure as well as in the previous applications.  
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 6 What preconditions have to be met for an application of the 
AW procedure to civil war negotiations? 
The hypothetical applications of the AW procedure in chapter 5 showed how the issues of 
wealth sharing can be treated by the procedure and an arguably fair settlement meeting 
the criteria of equitability, envy-freeness and efficiency can be worked out. However, the 
hypothetical application of the AW procedure to the issues of wealth sharing involved 
serious challenges. Below, a critical assessment of the application of the AW procedure to 
the issues of wealth sharing serve as a starting point for a discussion on what general 
preconditions have to be met in order to apply the AW procedure to civil war 
negotiations. Aspects from the theoretical investigation in chapter 3 and the case study of 
the negotiations on wealth sharing in chapter 4 are also taken up in this discussion.  
6.1 Defining what winning and sharing implies for different types of issues 
Both the challenge of point allocation and the “decoding” of the point allocated outcome 
into a real-life settlement demonstrated that it must be clear in advance what winning and 
sharing will imply for each party in an application of the AW procedure. The utility value 
of an issue can not be determined for a party if it does not know what will be gained by 
winning or lost by losing. Further, the real-life implications of the outcome of the 
procedure can only be formulated if it is clear what winning will imply for each party. 
Otherwise, this will potentially be contested by the parties after the procedure has been 
carried out and the settlement may not be accepted. It is therefore clear that a basic 
precondition for applying the AW procedure is that the parties can agree to what winning 
and sharing on each issue shall imply for each party.   
The hypothetical application of the AW procedure suggests that issues differ in regard to 
the prospects of meeting this precondition. For issues with few alternatives and clear 
solutions the implications of winning for each party were relatively clear, while for 
multifaceted issues, as central bank and currency, a quite detailed account on what 
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 winning and sharing will imply for each party was required. However, winning and losing 
implications for multifaceted issues may still be easier for parties to agree to than for 
clear-cut issues. For multifaceted issues the parties’ concerns may be easier to meet as 
there are a high number of alternative solutions to such issues. Also, sharing and 
equitability adjustments may be more acceptable when the issues are multifaceted. This is 
because the many facets of the issue allow small alternations of the solution in favour of 
one or the other party.   
A potential problem in agreeing to what winning and sharing shall imply on different 
issues is that each party will argue for the best arrangement they can get in defining what 
winning will imply. Mediators can suggest such implications, but it may be hard for the 
parties to accept the proposed winning gains for each party. The reason for this is that the 
parties then must acknowledge what will be an “acceptable” loss on the different issues 
and that may reveal the preferences and dispositions of the party. A central part of 
bargaining is to stick to maximalistic positions in order to gain as many concessions from 
the opposite part as possible. If parties shall agree on what winning will imply for each 
party on the different issues, it will be tempting for a party to hold on a maximalistic 
position as what winning will imply. The fact that the actual arrangements created by the 
procedure to a large extent will be dependent on what is defined as winning for each 
party, means that agreeing to what winning shall imply will be a considered a most 
important step of applying the AW procedure. If the negations are conducted in “good 
faith” as Brams and Taylor (1999: 104) point out, working out what winning and sharing 
shall imply on each issue should be possible. However, in “tug-of-war” negotiations (as is 
most likely in civil war negotiations) the tactical aspects of agreeing to what winning and 
sharing shall imply will probably play an important role. Thus, agreeing to what winning 
and sharing will entail is likely to be a though precondition to meet in an application of 
the AW procedure to civil war negotiations.  
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 6.2 Balanced winning and sharing implications 
Eventually, in the process of agreeing to certain winning and sharing implications there is 
a question of how active the mediators should be. In an indirect application of the 
procedure (which is most likely), mediators will be active suggesting what they view as 
reasonable winning and sharing implications. In a more direct application of the AW 
procedure, the parties are active in bargaining over winning and losing implications. Such 
a party driven process of negotiation may enhance the ownership of the deal and sort out 
acceptable winning and losing implications, but it may not necessary lead to “balanced” 
winning and losing implications. 
If there is a significant asymmetry of power between the parties, a powerful negotiating 
party may have a strong influence on what is defined as winning and sharing on the 
different issues and the deal produced by the AW procedure will to a large extent favor 
the strong party.56 Can the AW produced settlement then be labelled as fair? As the steps 
of the AW procedure have been carried out and the parties have technically received an 
equal amount of point allocated utility value, the outcome can be claimed to be 
procedurally fair. However, the exchange rates of the utility points are different for the 
parties. One party wins more in real life than the other although their technical 
satisfaction of utility points are equal. In such a situation, and given that the parties had an 
equal entitlement to the issues, the outcome of the AW procedure can not be considered 
as de facto fair. It therefore seems as if there is a great asymmetry of power (for instance 
if one party is controlling more attractive endowments than the other), a powerful third-
party or mediator is required to establish winning and sharing implications in which not 
only favors the stronger party but which also take into account important considerations 
                                              
56
 This argument is similar to the general argument made by Hilde Henriksen Waage (2004) in a report on the role of Norway as 
a mediator between the Israelis and the Palestinians in 1993 (the “Oslo channel”). Henriksen Waage claims that the Oslo peace 
process reflected the fundamentally asymmetrical power relation between the Israelians and the Palestinians. Although the 
Norwegian mediators strove to ensure process symmetry in the negotiations, the room of manoeuvre was strictly limited by the 
Israelian power supremacy and Yasser Arafat and the PLO’s weak position. Eventually the Norwegian mediation served to 
facilitate a deal which left out a core issue (the Israeli settlements on the occupied territories) and established a peace agreement 
largely on the premises of the stronger party Israel.  
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 of the weaker party. This argument assumes that the parties should have equal 
entitlements to the endowments at stake and that “balanced” or reasonable winning and 
sharing implications can be established.  
If the AW procedure is applied where winning and sharing implications to a large extent 
is dictated by one party, it can serve to legitimate a deal as equitable although it strongly 
favors one party. Still, the AW procedure can be applied as a means of getting a deal in a 
civil war negotiation, although the settlement created is only fair de jure as the winning 
implications to a large extent favor one party.  
The discussion above demonstrates the centrality of the winning and sharing implications 
for the prospects of a de facto fair outcome of the AW procedure. If cake-pieces or clear-
cut goods are going to be shared by applying the AW procedure the winning and sharing 
implications can easily be singled out to be the same for the parties. In such a situation 
none of the parties can claim a right to win more than the other on an item. However, in a 
conflict over issues in an institutional context that have to involve different winning and 
sharing implications for the parties, a great challenge is to sort out what are reasonable 
winning and sharing implications for the parties. If the parties of a civil war negotiation 
should be equally entitled to the issues, what winning and sharing implications do these 
mean in real life? What is a reasonable balance of winning and sharing implications in a 
civil war negotiation? What kind of aspects should be considered by a mediator when 
proposing certain winning and sharing implications?  
The questions above point to fundamental matters of fairness as well as practical 
challenges of what solutions will work where. For issues involving a simple sharing of 
goods or bads, norms as equal treatment, proportionality and exemption may serve as 
guidelines of what positions are fair (Underdal 1998: 312). For complex issues, 
“international best practice” (like what institutions have provided stability in other 
conflict ridden countries) may be a more relevant reference as to what positions are 
reasonable. I will not try to answer the question of what are reasonable winning and 
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 sharing implications any further here. However, note that both the parties and the 
mediators have to face the question of what are balanced or reasonable winning and 
sharing implications when applying the AW procedure. That means that when applying 
the AW procedure to issues where the winning and sharing implications are not clear, 
fundamental questions of fairness have to be addressed. The AW procedure can not be 
applied and automatically give an outcome which can be labelled as de facto fair. The 
AW procedure is a tool of converging on one outcome in a negotiation, but to what extent 
its outcome can be labelled as de facto fair and correspond to equal entitlements is 
decided by the winning and sharing implications rather than the application of the 
procedure itself. Thus, that winning and sharing implications can be worked out which 
correspond to equal entitlements of the parties is a precondition for creating a de facto fair 
outcome of the AW procedure.  
In practice, the parties may themselves be able to establish balanced winning and sharing 
implications by haggling over the issues. However, if there is a great asymmetry of power 
between the parties, and it is a goal by applying the AW procedure to establish a 
settlement based on equal entitlements, a mediator or a strong third party is necessary to 
guarantee balanced winning and sharing implications. By applying various forms of 
leverage, mediators can work to make the parties accept certain winning and sharing 
implications or eventually an AW produced outcome based on these premises. It has to be 
specified that a mediator in itself is not sufficient for guaranteeing balanced winning 
implications as mediators surely have their own agenda. However, I assume that some 
winning implications are more reasonable than others and that mediators have the 
potential to propose balanced winning implications. At the same time, what winning 
implications that are reasonable is likely to be contested even among relatively neutral 
mediators. For both the parties and the mediators it will thus be a highly challenging and 
contested part of applying the AW procedure to sort out what are balanced winning and 
sharing implications.  
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 6.3 Winning and sharing implications increasing the chances for a successful 
implementation of the peace deal 
In sorting out winning and sharing implications it is not only a question of what 
implications balance the parties’ entitlements, but also a question of what terms of 
agreement which are likely to ensure post-conflict stability. Balanced winning and sharing 
implications and thus a de facto fair outcome of the AW procedure are likely to increase 
the chances for a successful implementation of the agreement as the parties perceive the 
deal as fair (given that the parties recognizes the other party’s right to equal entitlements). 
However, there is a great question as to what specific post-conflict arrangements are 
going to be established by the AW produced deal and whether these are likely to ensure 
post-conflict stability. As was discussed in chapter 3.3.3, one important aspect for 
increasing the chances for a successful implementation of the deal, is that the winning and 
sharing implications incorporate robust self-enforcing mechanisms and allow credible 
security guarantees and third-party support if that is an issue. 
A number of other aspects, such as the extension of political inclusiveness, are also likely 
to be important for post-conflict stability. In the case of the negotiations on wealth sharing 
in Sudan, there are several examples of claims by the parties which most probably had 
been problematic for post-conflict development. The SPLA/M claimed at a certain time 
during the negotiations the establishment of a de facto independent central bank in 
Southern Sudan, but at the same time proposed a joint monetary policy. If this outcome 
had been used as a basis for what winning should imply for the SPLA/M on the issue of 
central bank and the SPLA/M had won on this issue by allocating most points on it, the 
AW procedure could have created a settlement of banking institutions in Sudan which 
would be hard to combine with a joint monetary policy. At a certain time during the 
negotiations, the SPLA/M also argued for an arrangement of two permanent currencies in 
Sudan. This would probably represent a great disadvantage as it would be a serious 
hindrance for trade and economic integration in Sudan and a stable exchange policy 
would be hard to uphold. These examples from the hypothetical application of the AW 
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 procedure suggest that although an AW produced settlement is arguably fair, the issues 
may be settled in a way that hardly can be sustainable in a post-conflict environment. This 
means that an application of the AW procedure will not be any guarantee that the terms of 
the agreement ensure post-conflict stability. The types of arrangements that are defined by 
the winning and sharing implications and their suitability in the actual context are 
probably as important for the prospects of post-conflict stability as whether the settlement 
is procedurally fair.  
6.4 Parties willing to make explicit trade-offs between the issues 
While the presentation of the negotiations on wealth sharing of the IGAD talks showed 
that many issues were resolved by making compromises on the different issues, the AW 
procedure produces a settlement by primarily making trade-offs between issues and only 
to a minor extent by producing compromises or trade-offs inside larger issues. This 
suggests that in an application of the AW procedure making trade-offs between the issues 
must be an acceptable and constructive way of reaching a settlement for the parties. 
Trade-offs occur in most negotiations, but the extent of trade-offs differ significantly. 
According to one SPLA/M informant (2004 [interview]), the SPLA/M adopted a strategy 
in the talks to not trade across the larger issues, but only within these issues. He claimed 
that for the SPLA/M it seemed advantageous to not trade across, as that would not 
guarantee them a certain share on each issue. One international observer claimed that the 
SPLA/M seemed to have less time pressure than the GOS and had the possibility to hold 
on to positions for a long time in order to obtain maximum concessions from the GOS 
instead of involving in trade-offs (Goulty 2004 [interview]). This shows that if a party 
perceives it to be favorable to not trade between issues and if it is willing to take the risks 
of this strategy over time, an application of the AW procedure will not be acceptable as a 
conflict resolution mechanism for this party.  
However, in many negotiations it is likely that some positions have to be traded between 
issues to reach an agreement. This suggests that an application of the AW procedure can 
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 be fruitful in what seems to be a final stage of negotiations if there are several outstanding 
issues in this phase. Possibly the procedure can be introduced to produce acceptable trade-
offs between issues and enable the parties to reach a settlement. Also if the parties have 
tried to find acceptable compromises on the different issues and there is a situation of 
deadlock, the AW procedure can possibly stimulate further talks by having a creative role 
in what winning and sharing implications can be carried out and which trade-offs are 
possible between the issues. The AW procedure can also have a reality orienting role in 
such a phase by ascertain a specific bargaining set and range of solutions and make clear 
that trade-offs have to be made to get an agreement (Brams and Taylor 1999: 109). 
6.5 Agreement to a set of separable issues 
The fact that the resource persons during the IGAD talks played an important role in 
finding ways to address the issues, also suggest that the AW procedure only can be 
applied in a later phase of negotiations. In earlier phases of negotiations the issues may 
seem chaotic and the knowledge of the parties may be limited in how to address the 
issues. Under such conditions the AW procedure can not be applied, as the parties can not 
agree to a list of issues and will feel a need to elaborate more on the issues before settling 
on them. If the issues involved are simple and the parties can accept a “quick and dirty” 
process to settle the issues, the AW procedure may be acceptable at an early stage of 
negotiations. However, clear-cut issues and attitudes of parties toward a “quick and dirty” 
process are unlikely in civil war negotiations involving life-and-death questions for the 
parties.  
In the hypothetical application of the AW procedure I simply assume that the chosen set 
of issues would be acceptable as a set of issues for the parties. As the mediators of the 
IGAD talks regularly updated lists on what were the outstanding issues, that assumption is 
probably unproblematic in this application of the AW procedure. However, there are 
strategic aspects regarding the set of issues that parties of civil war negotiations may 
consider. For a party it may be tactical to include a minor issue which the party does not 
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 regard as important, but which may be important for the other party. The tactical aspect of 
this is to let the other party use some of its points on this issue and thereby have fewer 
points to allocate on the other issues. This means that to avoid haggling over the set of 
issues when applying the AW procedure (either directly or indirectly), a particular set of 
issues should be sorted out before introducing the procedure.  
As was presented in chapter 3.2.3 on the specific assumptions of the AW procedure, the 
parties also have to agree to a set of separable issues (meeting the precondition of 
additivity). This means that a precondition of applying the AW procedure is that the 
parties do not only have to overcome the tactical aspects of agreeing to a specific set of 
issues, but also to accept a set of separable issues.  
To what extent all outstanding issues should be included in the set of issues which is 
going to be divided by the AW procedure, must be evaluated by the mediators and the 
parties. Some issues at stake may have to be solved outside the AW procedure as they can 
not be rendered separable in a meaningful way. Other issues may be so vital for the 
parties that they can neither be solved by making trade-offs nor by haggling over winning 
and losing implications.  In the case of the negotiations on wealth sharing of the IGAD 
talks, the divergent positions to the issue of ownership of subterranean natural resources 
seemed so fundamentally important for the parties that the issue had to be left undecided 
to at all get an agreement on wealth sharing. Technically it would be possible to include 
this issue when carrying out the AW procedure, but for the parties it would be highly 
problematic to settle the issue (as was discussed in chapter 5.1).  
6.6 Accepting to establish an equitable, envy-free and efficient settlement 
An obvious and general precondition of applying the AW procedure to negotiations is that 
the parties can accept to establish an equitable, envy-free and efficient settlement based 
on a specific satisfaction of utility value. Although trivial, this precondition is interesting 
as it highlights fundamental challenges of applying the AW procedure to civil war 
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 negotiations. In chapter three on theory, it was discussed that although a settlement 
characterized by envy-freeness, equitability and efficiency may increase the likelihood of 
a successful implementation of the agreement there are problematic aspects of assuming 
that all of these criteria of fairness will be normatively and rationally acceptable for a 
party. One party may feel historically neglected development and may claim in principle a 
greater share of the issues than another party. Then an equal sharing of subjective utility 
may not seem as a fair deal for this party. Another possibility is that the parties may have 
different endowments when negotiation starts. Then it will be acting against self-interests 
for a party with greater endowments to accept the principles of equitability and envy-
freeness, if it perceives that it will get a more favorable deal by relying on its power of 
controlling more endowments.  
In the case study of the negotiations on wealth sharing in Sudan this problematic 
assumption manifested. The starting point of the negotiations was a situation where the 
GOS controls most of the state powers and resources of Sudan, while SPLA/M had 
relatively few means of power except for the territories it occupies, the support it has 
among several Sudanese groups and the potential backing from Western powers 
(especially American). In the negotiations the GOS thus had to give away more of what it 
controls than the SPLA/M had to, simply as the GOS controlled most of the issues which 
were at stake. Still, the fundamental position of the GOS in the negotiations seemed to be 
status quo solutions and minimizing the sharing of wealth with the SPLA/M. Introducing 
concepts of fairness where a settlement is to be established by strictly giving each party 
the same satisfaction of utility, would probably to a great extent seem to be not strategic 
for the GOS (at least in the short run).  
Theoretically, this situation can be described as one where the parties are controlling 
different sizes of endowments. The AW procedure may then be unacceptable as it 
produces a settlement out of a situation where all the issues, independently of whom 
controls them, are going to be shared and can be assigned utility values. By the AW 
procedure the parties are given equal satisfaction of utility out of a non-agreement 
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 situation where the parties have no utility satisfied. However, when one party controls 
more goods or issues than the other, the AW procedure will create a settlement where the 
party controlling most will have a smaller gain compare to its initial endowment than the 
other parties. The AW solution may still be better than the fallback position for the party 
controlling most goods, but the party controlling more goods or issues will not regard the 
AW settlement as equitable as it has received a lesser gain of utility value than the other 
party. This means that applying the AW procedure may be unacceptable for a party 
controlling more goods or issues than the other. 
One possible way to overcome such a situation where the AW procedure is likely to be 
unacceptable would be to start to gain support from the parties for certain implications of 
winning and sharing. Possibly, these implications can be outlined so that the party with 
greater endowments are favored. However, then a problem would arise that the deal 
would not be de facto fair (assuming that the parties should have equal entitlements to the 
issues), but only fair de jure. The AW procedure can still be carried out if it is likely that 
the AW produced settlement is sufficient for building peace. 
6.7 Acceptance and understanding of the whole methodology of the AW 
procedure 
Applying the AW procedure to civil war negotiations do not only involve acceptance of a 
fair settlement based on a specific satisfaction of utility value, but also a more general 
acceptance and understanding of the whole methodology of the AW procedure. For an 
application of the AW procedure the parties have to understand and accept the stages and 
concepts of the AW procedure, involving point allocation of utility value, sharing 
according to the ranking of the issues, finely-tuned equitability adjustments and an 
outcome with the characteristics of fairness based on the allocation of utility points. Only 
if parties have understood these steps and are familiar with them, they can agree to point 
allocate the utility value of the issues.  
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 The informants were asked on the likelihood of an application of the AW procedure to the 
IGAD talks. Some gave positive replies, but generally the informants were highly critical 
to applying the AW procedure. One mediator of the IGAD secretariat and one 
representative of the SPLA/M claimed that the procedure could have been introduced 
during the peace process. The IGAD mediator (Page 2004 [interview]) suggested that a 
couple of days had to be spent on presenting and discussing the procedure and then it 
could possibly be a framework for the parties to reach an agreement. On the other hand, 
two GOS informants (2004 [interview]) and two SPLA/M informants (2004 [interview]) 
were highly sceptical to the procedure as it so explicitly focuses on trade-offs between 
issues. Their experience was that progress on the issues came when compromises were 
made inside each issue. One observer (Hødnebø 2004 [interview] was highly critical to 
the AW procedure as it seems to be a rigid structure which do not allow for the 
complexity of the issues of civil war negotiations. One observer (Goulty 2004 
[interview]) and a resource person (Stiansen 2004 [interview]) were also highly sceptical 
to the methodology of the procedure in a context of civil war negotiations. According to 
Stiansen, the parties have numerous tasks they are concerned with during the negotiations. 
It is therefore highly unlikely that they can accept to spend up to several days on getting 
familiar with technical aspects of a mathematical procedure.  
In presenting the AW procedure, a mediator does not only have to show that it guarantees 
envy-freeness, equitability and efficiency, but also that dishonest point allocation and 
strategy in a game-theoretic sense easily fails if the other party also tries to be tactical and 
not honest in point allocation.57 Brams and Taylor (1999: 101) suggest that a way to 
convince parties that manipulation of points is hazardous when information is incomplete 
is to let the parties “go through the exercise of allocating insincere points for itself and 
                                              
57
 Brams and Taylor (1996: 246) differ between ”strategy in game theory” and “strategy in fair division”. “Strategy in game 
theory” they define as ”a complete plan that specifies the course of action a player will follow, depending on the strategies of the 
other players”. “Strategy in fair division” they define as “advice to a player about the choices he or she should make, based on that 
player’s preferences, that are consistent with a procedure’s rules and give a solution having certain properties”.  
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 then test (via AW) the outcome of such an assignment against various point assignments 
that its opponent might make”. This may convince the parties that honest allocations are a 
smart strategy in general, but it may also make the parties in doubt of the fairness 
guarantees of the AW procedure as there is some potential for allocating points with a 
game-theoretic strategy and win on it. As the stakes in civil war negotiations are 
immense, taking such a risk and committing to a binding procedure will probably be 
unacceptable for the parties. Thus applying the AW procedure both involves a challenge 
of justifying the time spent on presenting the procedure as well as a challenge that the 
guaranteed properties of the procedure may be questioned. Both these challenges of 
applying the AW procedure to civil war negotiations suggest that an application can only 
occur indirectly by the mediators. 
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 7 Conclusion  
Three investigations have been carried out in this thesis to identify the preconditions of 
applying the AW procedure to civil war negotiations. First a theoretical investigation was 
carried out by using theory on conflict resolution and bargaining to discuss assumptions 
of applying the AW procedure to civil war negotiations. Second, an empirical 
investigation was conducted into the negotiations on wealth sharing between the GOS and 
the SPLA/M in the IGAD talks of making peace in Sudan. This investigation served to 
highlight some of the practical considerations regarding an application of the AW 
procedure. Third, the AW procedure was applied hypothetically to the issues of wealth 
sharing of the IGAD talks and what seemed to be important preconditions for such an 
application were identified. 
The preconditions for applying the AW procedure to civil war negotiations that are 
identified in this thesis are presented in table 7.1. The preconditions are of various types 
and can be categorized. Some of the preconditions regard the issues at stake, like the 
preconditions of additivity and linearity. Other preconditions do primarily regard the 
parties and their acceptance of the different requirements of the procedure. Acceptance of 
point allocation of utility value and engagement in trade-offs are some of the important 
preconditions regarding the parties. Another set of preconditions regard the mediators and 
their capability to apply the procedure. For instance must the mediators be able to 
demonstrate for the parties that the AW procedure guarantees them a favorable settlement 
and eventually be trusted by the parties so they are willing to reveal their preferences 
(particularly if direct application). Finally, a precondition has been identified which are 
assumed to increase the chances for a successful implementation of a peace deal. This 
precondition regards the implications of winning and sharing of the issues and states that 
the implications must establish self-enforcing mechanisms and allow necessary third party 
support if implementation of the deal shall have a good chance of succeeding.  
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 Table 7.1: Preconditions which have to be met for applying the AW procedure to 
civil war negotiations  
Preconditions regarding 
the issues at stake 
 
Additative utility of the issues (separable issues)  
Linear utility values of the issues (constant marginal utilities 
when sharing the issues) 
Preconditions regarding 
the parties 
 
In general, the parties must perceive the payoffs of applying the 
AW procedure to be greater than both negotiating without it and 
the reversion point of breaking the negotiations. 
The parties have to understand and accept the whole methodology 
of the AW procedure.  This means that the parties have to accept: 
- a specific set of issues 
- specific implications of what winning and sharing shall imply on 
each issue (some form of balanced implications are a necessity for 
a de facto fair outcome of the AW procedure) 
- to engage in (if direct application) or conform to (if indirect 
application) a certain point allocation of utility value of the issues  
- explicit trade-offs between most issues 
- the normative principles of an equitable, envy-free and efficient 
settlement  
- to bind themselves to an unknown outcome of the procedure 
based on the guaranteed “fair” properties of the settlement (can be 
relaxed if indirect application) 
Preconditions regarding 
the mediators 
The mediators must:  
- be able to convince the parties that the AW procedure 
guarantees a settlement with favorable properties 
- be trusted by the parties so they are willing to reveal their 
preferences (particularly if direct application) 
- be able to demonstrate the hazardous risk of dishonest 
point allocations 
- be able to work out reasonable winning and sharing 
implications (particularly if indirect application) 
- be able to assign realistic point allocations (only if 
indirect application) 
Preconditions increasing 
the chance for a 
successful 
implementation  
Winning and sharing implications that incorporate self-enforcing 
mechanisms and allow necessary third party support  
 
 121
 Several of the preconditions listed in table 7.1 do not particularly regard civil war 
negotiations, but are rather requirements for applying the AW procedure to conflicts in 
general. The preconditions thus seem generalizable in terms of being requirements that 
have to be met in most applications of the AW procedure, independent of whether it is a 
civil war negotiation or another type of conflict. Another point is that several of the 
preconditions are trivial or tautological; the preconditions are part of the AW procedure 
itself. Some of the preconditions may thus rather be labeled prerequisites of the AW 
procedure than preconditions. A third comment to the preconditions identified is that 
many of them have been pointed out by other contributions on the AW procedure and are 
adopted from these works. For instance Brams and Taylor (1996 and 1999) discuss 
additivity, linearity and willingness to point allocation as basic requirements of applying 
the AW procedure. Brams and Taylor (1999) also discuss a number of practical 
considerations when applying the AW procedure, such as the precondition of agreeing to 
what winning and losing implies and the necessity of a mediator who can demonstrate the 
great risks of being dishonest in allocating points.  
However, a contribution of this thesis has been to make the various preconditions of the 
AW procedure explicit and discuss them in relation to civil war negotiations. Also, the 
investigations of this thesis have highlighted some aspects of the AW procedure that have 
only been addressed to a limited extent in other works. One aspect is the fundamentality 
of defining what winning and sharing implies. Defining what winning and sharing implies 
is not only a necessary initial step of carrying out the AW procedure, but has large 
consequences for what settlement the AW procedure produces. To produce a settlement 
that corresponds to equal entitlements, the winning and sharing implications do have to be 
balanced between the parties. Agreeing to what winning and losing entails is thus likely to 
be a step that will decide whether the procedure is acceptable or not for parties and 
eventually whether the parties can have a sense of an equitable deal or not.  
Another related aspect of applying the AW procedure which has been addressed in this 
thesis is the case of parties controlling different sizes of endowments. In such a situation, 
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 if the implications of winning and losing are balanced equally among the parties, an 
application of the AW procedure will not be viewed as equitable by the party controlling 
most endowments as the relative gains of the party with greater endowments will be less 
than for the party with fewest initial endowments. The party controlling most 
endowments may use this control to bargain for a favorable outcome and is likely to not 
accept the AW procedure. However, the AW procedure may still be applied as a powerful 
mediator may support its application, or the party with less initial endowments may be 
able to put efforts into convincing the other party of the prospects of a stable deal if the 
AW procedure is applied.  
Can the preconditions of the AW procedure realistically be met in a case of civil war 
negotiations? The discussion on the preconditions in chapter 6 demonstrated that the AW 
procedure can only be applied in what seems to be a later phase of negotiations. When the 
parties have sorted out what are the remaining issues and there exist some form of 
deadlock, the AW procedure may be introduced legitimately as a mean of resolving a 
crisis at the negotiation table. However, a direct application of the AW procedure 
involves a high risk for the parties as the specific outcome of the deal is unknown and the 
parties have to reveal their preferences. In addition, the practical aspect of fine-tuning 
utility points corresponding to the importance of the issues is likely to be problematic for 
a party. An indirect application of the procedure may thus be more relevant in a civil war 
negotiation. The AW procedure can first be a tool for mediators and then possibly a 
framework for either putting pressure on the parties to reach a specific deal or facilitate a 
process towards a deal.     
This means that although the AW procedure provides a technical structure to work out 
what is a fair division of issues in a conflict, it is not a new great formula to solve the 
world’s conflicts. The AW procedure can not simply be applied and automatically 
produce a fair settlement. Specifically as a precondition of applying the AW procedure is 
to specify winning and sharing implications of the different issues, the AW procedure 
does not solve what may be at the core of fairness in civil war negotiations, namely the 
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 question of what are reasonable or fair demands of each party to the different issues. 
Whether an application of the AW procedure eventually can stimulate the last phase of a 
civil war negotiation towards a fair settlement (in terms of satisfying an equal level of 
subjective utility) will thus depend on how bargaining and mediation occurs in order to 
settle out what are the issues and their winning and sharing implications. That means that 
the AW procedure is not a recipe in itself, but relies on series of “traditional” mediation 
and bargaining to ever have a chance of facilitating a conflict.   
This does not imply that the AW procedure is not useful for settling other types of 
conflicts. In divorce conflicts for instance, where there are a limited number of goods and 
clear-cut issues, the AW procedure has greater chances of being applicable. Equal 
entitlements to the items can easily be established as the winning and sharing implications 
can be the same for both parties. Also, the fact that the parties in a divorce conflict are 
faced with an expensive arbitration in the courts if they do not settle the conflict by 
themselves will enhance the chances of an application of the AW procedure. This is in 
contrast to a civil war negotiation where going back to war may be a feasible option for 
the parties.  
Only a real-life application of the AW procedure can demonstrate with certainty whether 
the procedure can be a useful tool of civil war negotiations or not. According to one of the 
experienced mediators of the IGAD talks, successful mediation of civil war does not 
necessarily involve a specific approach or tactic. The AW procedure may thus in certain 
contexts be an acceptable and constructive framework for conflict resolution. In this 
respect, the discussion of the preconditions of the AW procedure in the thesis can 
hopefully serve as a useful background for mediators who stumble in civil war 
negotiations, like in Sri Lanka or Darfur, and have to decide whether or not to try an 
application of the AW procedure.   
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